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


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THESIS

**HYPER-NATIONALISM AND IRREDENTISM IN
THE MACEDONIAN REGION: IMPLICATIONS
FOR U.S. POLICY**

by

Dean T. Katsiyiannis

June 1995

Thesis Advisor:

David S. Yost

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**HYPER-NATIONALISM AND IRREDENTISM IN THE MACEDONIAN
REGION: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY**

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Captain, United States Army
B.S., Northern Illinois University, 1985

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the apparent intensification in hyper-nationalist sentiments in Greece and elsewhere in the Balkans resulting in part from international recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) as an independent nation-state in 1993-1994. The thesis concludes that Balkan hyper-nationalism and irredentism come to the fore when external powers are no longer imposing a quasi-peace on the Balkans and when there is a threat to the delicate balance of power in the Macedonian region. Both conditions have emerged since the breakup of the former Soviet Union and of the former Yugoslavia in 1991. The only solution that might successfully deal with these conditions would be a U.S.-led international effort to deter aggression and to promote economic recovery and democratic reform in the Balkans; but it is far from clear that such an effort will be made.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The historic struggle for Balkan hegemony through acquisition of the strategic Macedonian region has resumed. The military weakness of the newly independent Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) offers temptations to its neighbors, while irredentism has been manifest in FYROM itself. This phenomenon is leading to competitive or "hyper"-nationalism.¹ The result is a "spiraling effect" of misperceptions and increased animosity in the Balkans. Indeed, irredentist claims by FYROM and its neighbors have renewed past fears and resentments that have not been observed in the region since the end of the Greek Civil War in 1949.

This thesis investigates the apparent intensification in hyper-nationalist sentiments resulting in part from the international recognition of FYROM as an independent nation-state since 1993-1994, and the potential sparks that it may deliver to an already volatile Balkan crisis. It appears that irredentist competition has been a persistent factor in the troubled relations between Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria,

¹Stephen Van Evera defines hyper-nationalism as the glorification of one's national character, history, symbols, religion, etc., and of the rightness and legitimacy of one's cause, while maligning the claims of others. For background, see Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the cold War," International Security, Winter 1990/91, pp. 23-24.

Albania, and Turkey; and this helps to explain the continuity of certain themes in their relations today concerning the Macedonian question. Furthermore, it is generally agreed that the Macedonian region's location is of fundamental strategic value in controlling trade routes, arable land, and military avenues of approach to the Aegean Sea. It is widely believed in the Balkans that whoever controls this territory possesses a dominant strategic advantage.

Balkan alliances have historically formed along cultural and religious lines, and these alliances have involved links with the emergence of Great Power spheres of influence in the region. The potential for the conflict in the Balkans to escalate into a broader crisis--indeed, a larger war--is significant, partly because of the longstanding adversarial positions of Greece and Turkey and their roles in key European and transatlantic security institutions.

The thesis concludes that Balkan hyper-nationalism and irredentism come to the fore when external powers are no longer imposing a quasi-peace on the Balkans and when there is a threat to the delicate balance of power in the Macedonian region. Both conditions have emerged since the breakup of the former Soviet Union and of the former

Yugoslavia in 1991. The only solution that might successfully deal with these conditions would be a U.S.-led international effort to deter aggression and to promote economic recovery and democratic reform in the Balkans; but it is far from clear that such an effort will be made.

Myron Weiner's insightful model², written in 1971, predicted what might well happen when external forces, such as those engaged in the East-West power struggle of the Cold War, no longer dominated politics in the Balkans while local irredentist claims remained salient. Only the determined leadership of a great power, such as the United States, might be able to counter these forces by imposing a new set of principles of conduct.

Such leadership, according to Inis L. Claude, must possess the "resolution and audacity to move out front, to pull the majority along rather than to wait for it, to carry the lion's share of the burden while tolerating free riders, and to live with the inevitable criticism."³ The United States has proven itself capable of such leadership in the past. If it deems this situation in the southern Balkans

²Myron Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome: An Historical Model of International Relations and Political Development, World Politics, September 1971, pp. 665-683.

³Inis L. Claude, "Collective Security After the Cold War," Third Annual Strategy Conference, Strategic Studies Institute, February 1992, p. 18.

important to its security interests, and its initial approach suggests that it does, then it is imperative that it find the political will to provide leadership regarding this explosive issue.

I. INTRODUCTION

The upsurge of Balkan nationalism since the collapse of the Soviet empire has been reminiscent of the unstable situation caused by the collapse of the Ottoman empire during the 19th and early 20th centuries. Nationalist movements are gaining support today across Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the Balkans.

Loyalty (or enforced obedience) to the state is being supplanted by loyalty to an ethnic or national group that desires an independent state of its own, or that advocates territorial acquisitions at the expense of another independent state (irredentism).¹ This phenomenon is leading to competitive or "hyper"-nationalism,² which is causing a "spiraling effect" of misperceptions and increased animosity in the Balkans today.

The historic struggle for Balkan hegemony through the acquisition of the strategic Macedonian region has been

¹Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), p. 6.

²Stephen Van Evera defines hyper-nationalism as the glorification of one's national character, history, symbols, religion, etc., and of the rightness and legitimacy of one's cause, while maligning the claims of others. For background, see Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the cold War," International Security, Winter 1990/91, pp. 23-24.

revitalized by the tempting, weakened condition of the newly independent Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Irredentist claims by FYROM and its neighbors have renewed past fears and resentments not observed in the region since the cessation of the Greek Civil War in 1949. Some of the most obvious current examples of hyper-nationalism at work may be found in the Balkan region: in the breakup of Yugoslavia; in the Macedonian question; and in the irredentist movement within southern Albania (known in Greece as northern Epirus). The nations involved in nearly every dispute are Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, Albania, and Turkey.

This thesis investigates the apparent intensification in hyper-nationalist sentiments resulting from the international recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) as an independent nation-state since 1993-1994, and the potential sparks that it may deliver to an already volatile Balkan crisis.

A crucial aspect of this study is an analysis of claims -- historical, cultural, and ethnic -- to the Macedonia region and the perceived threat these claims present to the balance of power in the region. The analysis deals with the following questions: Why is the Macedonian region such a contested area? What past experiences have contributed to

the hatred and resentment in this volatile region? To what extent has FYROM's decision for independence contributed to the rise in competitive nationalism in all of its neighbors? And what are the prospects for the nationalist and irredentist ambitions that have become evident--for instance, Greece's perception of FYROM's claims regarding the Greek Macedonian territory? This thesis investigates the historical antecedents in the struggle for the Macedonian region in order to draw analogies for contemporary analytical purposes.

A. BACKGROUND AND APPROACH

It appears that the competition to obtain lost territory through irredentism has been a persistent factor in the troubled relations between Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, Albania, and Turkey and helps to explain the continuity of certain themes in their relations today concerning the Macedonian question. Furthermore, it also appears that the Macedonian region's strategic location in southeastern Europe is fundamental in controlling trade routes, arable land, and military avenues of approach to the Aegean Sea. It is widely believed in the Balkans that whoever controls this territory possesses a dominant strategic advantage in the balance of power in the region. Writing about the importance of this region, Barbara Jelavich says:

The great significance of the area [the Macedonian region] was its strategic location. It was the heart of the peninsula....For the Balkan nationalities, the issue was even more immediate and vital: whoever held Macedonia would have the predominant strategic position in the peninsula. The chief objection, it will be remembered, to the great Bulgaria of [the Treaty of] San Stefano [of 1878] had been that the boundaries assigned, incorporating Macedonia, would make the state the strongest in the Balkans.³

This inquiry also analyzes the "spiraling effect" of Balkan hyper-nationalism in the struggle for the Macedonian region, and the plausibility of a wider Balkan conflict. A crucial aspect of this study is an investigation of the formation of Balkan alliances (actual or potential) along cultural-religious lines, and how these alliances seem to involve links with the emergence of Great Power spheres of influence and power politics in the region.

Perceptions and misperceptions play an important role in the escalation of competitive nationalism within the Macedonian region. Misperceptions of foreign actions and intentions have developed throughout Balkan history owing to a "strategic culture"⁴ that is characterized by an

³Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 89-90.

⁴Ken Booth defines strategic culture as "a nations's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force." Ken Booth, "The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed," in Strategic Power: USA/USSR, ed. Carl G. Jacobsen (London: Macmillan, 1990), p.

"Eastern" (i.e., non-Western) identity. This "Eastern" identity was formed as a result of the great schism between the Roman Catholic West and the Orthodox East in 1054 A.D., and the Ottoman Empire's influences during nearly 400 years of rule in the Balkans. According to S. Victor Papacosma,

For generations educated Europeans and Americans have been inspired by and have learned about the achievements of Greece's Classical period that spawned so much of what we recognize as Western civilization. But they have learned little about the exotic 1000-year Byzantine Empire and even less about the period of alien Ottoman Turkish domination, both of which affected Greek [and more generally, Balkan] culture. Because of these latter developments, the Greek world assumed more of an "eastern" identity that separated it from areas to its west in Europe.⁵

Papacosma's analysis suggests that in the current escalation of tensions in the Balkans, decision-makers (and mass publics) may be perceiving the actions or intentions of their neighbors as more hostile than they actually are, or they may view the behaviour of their historic enemies as more purposeful, coordinated, and complex than it really is.⁶ Although this alone may not create the impetus for

121.

⁵S. Victor Papacosma, "Politics and Culture in Greece," Institute for Social Research (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Center for Political Studies, 1988), p. 3.

⁶Fourteen hypotheses concerning misperceptions by decision-makers are described by Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," International Politics, ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), pp. 472-486.

conflict, it may be enough to blind political elites and prevent them from seeing that "the other side is reacting out of fear of the first side, which can lead to self-fulfilling prophecies and spirals of misperception and hostility."⁷

Finally, this study compares the characteristic patterns of political development and international relations among the principal Balkan states involved in irredentist disputes, on the basis of the historical model suggested by Myron Weiner.⁸ The purpose is to seek a better understanding of the causes of conflict, and of the probable courses of action of the disputants. Proposed solutions to the conflict are then critically evaluated in chapter 5.

B. SIGNIFICANCE

The potential for the conflict in the Balkans to escalate into a broader crisis--indeed, a larger war--is significant, partly because of the longstanding adversarial positions of Greece and Turkey and their roles in key European security institutions.

It appears that Balkan political elites are attempting to promote a deeper understanding in Western elite circles

⁷Ibid., p. 484.

⁸Myron Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome: An Historical Model of International Relations and Political Development," World Politics, September 1971, pp. 665-683.

of the threats to national identity, cultural heritage, and national security that are perceived in Athens, Ankara and other capitals, in order to stimulate the major Western nations, especially those in the European Union and NATO, to address the factors that may lead to a wider Balkan conflict.

Because the Balkans are currently a hotbed of uncertainty and potential explosiveness, the study of threat perceptions and consequent alliance-building in this region is timely and relevant. This thesis may furnish a basis for generalizations about the origins and dynamics of hyper-nationalism and irredentism--problems of enduring concern in international security.

C. HYPOTHESIS

It is hypothesized that the current diplomatic stalemate concerning the Macedonian question is exacerbating Balkan hyper-nationalist sentiments, quickening the pace of aggressive provocations, and encouraging the formation of alliances and alignments. This process is leading Balkan states away from a peaceful settlement and could help cause an expanded war in the Balkans.

II. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR MACEDONIA

Three sets of factors help to explain the struggle for the Macedonian region: the region's intrinsic ethnic, geographic, and strategic significance; nationalist uprisings during the 19th and early 20th centuries; and great power politics and aspirations in the Balkan region.⁹ These factors remain pertinent today.

Although this region experienced relative peace and stability under the yoke of communism from the mid-1940's until Yugoslavia collapsed in 1991, it is now witnessing a series of changes that threaten the status quo of national borders and that could bring further instability to the Balkans. With the breakup of Yugoslavia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) declared its independent sovereignty on September 17, 1991, and applied for recognition from the United Nations.

This decision created a series of predicaments and stirred up past hatreds and resentments in a region where people do not easily forgive and forget. FYROM's independence brought to mind past grievances that were never fully reconciled, and (at least in the eyes of its

⁹Dimitrije Djordjevic and Stephen Fischer-Galati, Balkan Revolutionary Tradition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), p. 176.

neighbors) threatened to upset the regional balance of power. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet empire, Yugoslavia maintained a pro-Western (but nominally, non-aligned) policy in the region. From 1949 (with the conclusion of the Greek civil war) to 1991 (the breakup of Yugoslavia), Greece was able to use a strategy of detente, at times, with Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to counterbalance against perceived Turkish military advantages or threats in the region. Although Turkey and Greece were both NATO members after 1952, Greece still felt threatened by its eastern neighbor, and especially after the 1974 invasion of Cyprus. As long as a status quo was accepted with no disputes over borders along its north, Greece would then be able to concentrate its energies along its eastern front with Turkey.¹⁰

However, since the breakup of Yugoslavia, Balkan states must now contend with the possibility of FYROM allying with Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, or Turkey. This has created fear in many Balkan states--fear of "a negative tilt in the regional balance of power."¹¹ The primary concern Balkan states have with FYROM is the strategic importance of

¹⁰Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Nationalism and Small-State Foreign Policy: The Greek Response to the Macedonian Issue," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 109, num. 4, 1994, pp. 653-654.

¹¹Ibid., p. 654.

the land it occupies.

The Macedonian region is commonly regarded to have its northern border at the Sar Mountains in FYROM; its east bordered by the Rhodope Mountains in Bulgaria; its southern borders along the Pindus range, Mt. Olympus, and the Aegean Sea in Greece; and its western borders along Lake Ohrid, which skirts between FYROM and Albania.¹² Within this total region, approximately 50% is located in the boundaries of Greece, 40% in FYROM, and 10% in Bulgaria.

The Macedonian region's strategic location in southeastern Europe is fundamental. It commands the heart of the peninsula and the routes through the mountain passes to the key ports of Thessoloniki and Kavala on the Aegean Sea. As Elisabeth Barker points out, "Macedonia contains the main north-south route from central Europe to Salonica and the Aegean down the Morava and Vardar Valleys."¹³ Therefore, whoever controls this territory possesses a dominant strategic advantage in the balance of power in the region, and has the potential to either strengthen or lessen the dominant central European powers' influence in the

¹²Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century, p. 89.

¹³Elisabeth Barker, Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950), p. 17.

Mediterranean and the Middle East.¹⁴ That is why the region was coveted by not only the emerging Balkan states. As Wilkinson points out, "the governments of the four great empires of Austria-Hungary, Russia, Turkey, and Great Britain were alike conscious of maintaining or acquiring, as the case might be, control of the whole or part of Macedonia, which they rightly regarded to be the key to the Near East."¹⁵

Another way of viewing the geopolitical importance of this region is by comparing it with central Europe. Generally speaking, a strong power in central Europe has traditionally dominated the region and even at times threatened the security of its neighbors, but a weak power in central Europe has typically offered a great temptation to its neighbors for intervention and even appropriation. This pattern characterizes the situation in Macedonia and helps explain why it has been such a contested region.

A. BALKAN NATIONALIST UPRISINGS

Arguments given by Balkan states for Macedonian claims have been based on three principles: the "usable" past and

¹⁴Symeon A. Giannakos, "The Macedonian Question Reexamined: Implications for Balkan Security," Mediterranean Quarterly, Summer 1992, p. 34.

¹⁵H.R. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics: A Review of the Ethnographic Cartography of Macedonia (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1951), pp. 4-5.

historical precedents; the ethnic composition or national consciousness of the people; and the importance of maintaining a balance of power.¹⁶ Usually, a competitive, hyper-nationalism¹⁷ is the resulting effect of the claims made by an irredentist power. Hyper-nationalism has been the repetitive outcome in the struggle for control of the Macedonian region, and it is still prevalent today. Boyd Shafer describes the phenomenon of hyper-nationalism in the context of "mythmaking" and "self-glorification" in European education during the late 19th and early 20th centuries:

Text and teacher alike, with a few notable exceptions, taught the student that his own country was high-minded, great, and glorious. If his nation went to war, it was for defense, while the foe was the aggressor. If his nation won its wars, that was because his countrymen were braver and God was on their side. If his nation was defeated, that was due only to the enemy's overwhelmingly superior forces and treachery. If his country lost territory, as the French lost Alsace-Lorraine in 1870, that was a crime; whatever it gained was for the good of humanity and but its rightful due. The enemy was "harsh," "cruel," "backward." His own people "kind," "civilized," "progressive."¹⁸

This type of self-glorification and mythmaking created the paradigm, in many cases, that emerging Balkan states in

¹⁶Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century, p. 90.

¹⁷See footnote 3, for Stephen Van Evera's definition of the term "hyper-nationalism."

¹⁸Boyd Shafer, Nationalism: Myth and Reality (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955), p. 185, cited in Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," p. 23.

the 19th century used as a moral and legal basis to formulate foreign policy and pursue vital interests. Hence, hyper-nationalism was and still is a main contributing factor in the persisting struggle for dominance among the Balkan states. As a result of this distorted paradigm, Balkan states misperceived other states' actions or intentions, leading to a heightened state of tension in the competition for Macedonia.

This competition was also triggered by the decaying condition of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. For centuries, the Ottomans had dominated the territories and peoples of the Balkans with little interference from other Great Powers. However, the situation began to change when expansive designs and the rise of pan-Slavism commenced within the Russian Empire and when the rise in ethnic nationalism caused concern and insecurity within the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Another factor that contributed to the competition in the Balkans stemmed from the conceptual writings of the Enlightenment. Some of these writings, notably those by Rousseau, helped to encourage the strong political current of nationalism. This notion of nationalism aimed for the sovereignty of the nation-state through the self-determination of its people. No longer would the basis of

legitimacy and sovereignty be found in the king but instead in the people, and no longer would the people be mere subjects of the king but citizens of a sovereign nation-state.

Nationalism, and the idea of a national identity, also raised the status of the masses to a level that only a privileged few and a tiny elite were once allowed to hold. With Rousseau's concept of the "general will," the mass public was seen as the source of political legitimacy. The notion of nationalism dealt with the individual nation's importance and international status and position.¹⁹ Here the idea of nationality characterized itself in a common geographical area, a shared culture (language, ethnology, customs, traditions, history, religion, etc.), and an awareness of a shared destiny or sense of mission. Nationalism also based itself on the idea of an individual identity found within a "people," which Liah Greenfeld describes as the "bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity."²⁰

It was this "preoccupation with status" that motivated the inhabitants of this Balkan region to exchange their rank as occupied subjects for the rank of citizens in a

¹⁹Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 487-488.

²⁰Ibid., p. 3.

sovereign state. And it was precisely this striving and competition for sovereignty, within a crumbling Ottoman Empire, which brought Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria on a collision course in Macedonia. Evangelos Kofos says that the Macedonian question emerged during the Balkan nationalist movements of the 19th century because of the "hoped for withdrawal, or eviction of the Ottomans from their European possessions. The rush to fill the vacuum brought to the foreground the question of succession in Macedonia and Thrace, two regions of mixed ethnic composition."²¹

The common past in the Macedonian region is what all three emerging nation-states found attractive and useful. For Greece, the raising of the flag by the Bishop of Patras at the monastery of Agia Lavra on March 25, 1821, publicly symbolized the organized struggle for independence from the Ottomans, and placed Greece on the road toward a clash with its Slavic neighbors. Several factors help to explain the emergence of the Greek revolt of the 1820's. The works of the Enlightenment writers, such as De l'esprit des lois (The spirit of the Laws) by Montesquieu, were translated into the Greek language and distributed throughout Greece and the

²¹Evangelos Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia (New Rochelle, NY: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1993), p. 291.

Balkan region as a forerunner to the Greek revolution. In addition, the enlightened Rigas Velestinlis, influenced greatly by the French revolution, published 3,000 copies of his "revolutionary manifesto, a declaration of the rights of man, a constitution, and a martial hymn calling on the Balkan Christians to throw off their chains."²²

This ideology of "liberty, equality, and fraternity" had a strong appeal to the Greeks, who by now were pondering the notion of a nation-state based on the continuity of their language and ancestry dating back to the classical age. They envisioned, as many Balkan people did during this era, a state based on their own culture and history. Specifically, the Greeks cited the multiracial empires of Alexander the Great and the Byzantines as relevant historical examples (key elements of the "usable" past) for establishing a new nation-state.

The outcome of surveying their past was exhibited in the *Graecia irredenta*, or the "Great Idea." This aspiration imagined a Hellenic state covering those territories and regions populated by a Slavic and Turkish population. Consequently, the Greeks developed a concept of nationality, which did not emphasize ethnicity as a prerequisite for

²²Douglas Dakin, The Unification of Greece: 1770-1923 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972), p. 21.

citizenship. Douglas Dakin describes this idea of nationality as "Mazzinian," in which the Greeks "stressed the elements of language, common history, and individual consciousness"²³ as the basis of nationality. Dakin later says that "anyone who thought and called himself a Greek was, in general estimation, a Hellene."²⁴

It was natural at the time that the Greeks would adopt a notion of nationality such as described above. The classical era and civilization of ancient Greece had ended more than a thousand years earlier. Departing with that era was the sense of race or ethnic homogeneity. Waves of invading peoples descended into the Balkan peninsula. Goths, Huns, Avars, Slavs, Bulgars, and Magyars swept through and settled in the Balkans from the third to the seventh centuries. The responsibility of dealing with these diverse races fell on the Roman Empire, and in particular, the Eastern Roman Empire in Byzantium.

During the remainder of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century the Greeks attempted to pursue this "Great Idea" within the Balkan region. However, simultaneously, Slavic nationalism was on the rise, and this conflicted with Greek aspirations to regain the territories

²³Ibid., p. 8.

²⁴Ibid., p. 8.

of Macedonia and Thrace. Like the Greeks, the Slavs also looked to their history and culture as sources for nation-building efforts. And like the Greeks, both Serbia and Bulgaria coveted the regions of Macedonia and Thrace as a legacy of their past medieval empires.

The first Bulgarian Empire reached its zenith in the 9th and 10th centuries under the reign of Tsar Simeon (893-927). Its boundaries stretched from the Black Sea in the east to the Adriatic Sea in the west, and from the Danube in the north to the Pindus Mountain range in the south. Earlier, in 865, Christianity had become the accepted religion through the disciples of the two Orthodox missionaries - Cyril and Methodius. These two brothers introduced a Slavic script that later became the Cyrillic alphabet.

Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire, was coveted by the Bulgarians, and later by the Serbs and the Muslims for the symbolism it held in both the political and religious realm. The constant struggle for the conquest of Byzantium, along with internal conflicts and invasions by the Hungarians and Russians, exhausted the Bulgarians. Consequently, the Bulgarian Empire was reduced significantly in the 11th century to the southwest corner of its previous boundaries, and its capital moved from Preslav

in the northeast to Ohrid in the southwest (now located in present day FYROM). After a weakening of the Byzantine Empire in the 12th and 13th centuries, the Bulgarians under the reign of John Asen II (1218-1241) regained the height of their past Empire and again became a Balkan power.

However, this situation did not last for long. For the Serbs, under the Nemanja dynasty, were on the rise; and they would dominate the Balkans for several centuries until the expansion of the Ottoman Turks. The Serbian Empire reached its height under Stephen Dusan (1331-1355), with the territorial conquests of much of the second Bulgarian Empire. Serbia's expansion took place in a southern direction, and thus hastened the movement of its capital to Skopje (the present day capital of FYROM). The dominance of the Serbs as a Balkan power came to a close at the historic battle in Kosovo in 1389, where the combined forces of Serbs, Bosnians, and Albanians were defeated by the Ottomans.

B. CONTINUITY IN CLAIMS FOR THE ACQUISITION OF MACEDONIA

The competition for dominance of these medieval empires and the overlap of their past territories help to explain the struggle for the Macedonian region in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia each had a historic "usable" past that included a specific territory

and culture as a basis for visionary aspirations to nationhood. In addition, Myron Weiner says that other commonalities included the fact that: all were former colonies of the Ottoman Empire; all became monarchies at their time of independence; all were economically underdeveloped; all were multi-ethnic; and all had to develop within the sphere of Great Power rivalries during the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.²⁵

Ethnic claims played the most significant and controversial role in arguments regarding Macedonia. All Balkan nations seeking to gain influence and strengthen their arguments for territorial claims used ethnic composition and affiliation in Macedonia as a means to gain legitimacy. Since this was a period characterized by hyper-nationalism, a striking diversity of opinion--relating to misrepresentations of facts, ignorance about Balkan ethnography, and the unreliability of official censuses--emerged regarding the geographic distribution of the main ethnic groups in the Macedonian region.²⁶ Concerning this practice, Wilkinson says:

²⁵Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," p. 666.

²⁶For a summary of the causes of diverse opinion, and for a sense of the different views regarding ethnic distribution in the Macedonian region (figures 79-86), see Wilkinson, Maps and Politics, pp. 314-326.

The onus of establishing the affinities of its population fell upon parties interested in its strategic and economic possibilities rather than its people. All powers, both great and small, imperialistic and nationalistic, discerned the importance of putting exactly that interpretation on the ethnography of Macedonia which might best extend their influence in the area and so prepare the way for the establishment of local hegemony, or Near Eastern ascendancy, as the case might be.²⁷

Consequently, six Balkan nations neighbouring the Macedonian region made claims based on ethnic affinity, which was twice the amount of claims in any other region in the Balkans. This dilemma created an extreme disequilibrium in the nation-to-state-ratio in the Macedonian region.²⁸ That is, the demand for states by nations far exceeded the bounds of political feasibility, thus creating a disequilibrium and fostering immediate causes for conflict.

Besides these claims and the political currents of nationalism and idealism, another factor that caused unrest was the deteriorating economic and administrative condition of the Ottoman Empire. According to Gordon Craig,

Had Turkish administration been more efficient, the Christian subjects of those provinces would have had little to complain about...But the decline of the imperial system was accompanied by a cessation of even a pretense at economic improvement, and this made the subject peoples restive, while increasing their opposition to the numerous discriminatory taxes they

²⁷Ibid., p. 6.

²⁸Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism," p. 11.

had to pay.²⁹

Orthodox merchants - usually ethnic Greek, Armenian, or Serb - made up the bulk of the Ottoman population engaged in international trade and commerce.³⁰ From this vantage point, these sailors, shipowners, and commercial agents could travel abroad to the West and compare first hand the differences between the administrative, political, and economic systems in the Ottoman Empire and those of the rest of Europe. What they found was a large disparity between their condition and that of Western Europe, especially after the French revolution.

One major source of dissatisfaction for the influential merchant class was the network of corruption and inefficient infrastructure within the Ottoman Empire. Describing the conditions during the early 19th century, Barbara Jelavich says that "the merchant suffered from the poor roads and the unimproved waterways, and the disorder and anarchy in the countryside made his business dangerous...most important, he was almost completely without protection abroad."³¹ This distressed economic condition, along with other factors, led

²⁹Gordon A. Craig, Europe since 1815 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), p. 20.

³⁰Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Vol. I, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 179.

³¹Ibid., p. 185.

the Balkan Orthodox peoples to revolt against the Ottoman system.

The Ottoman system began its decline during the 18th century. Success for the Empire rested on the strength and abilities of the sultan and the military. After a string of extraordinary sultans, a rapid deterioration occurred because of a problem with succession.³² Since the sultan held absolute power in government, religious, and military matters, a decay in the competence and abilities of the sultan meant a deterioration in the Empire.

Next to the sultan in importance was the military, which played a principled role in maintaining the royal authority of the ruler.³³ Once the Empire ceased expanding, revenues diminished for the salaries of the standing armed forces and for technological improvements in weaponry. This meant that the professional soldier was forced to enter other ventures to assure financial security. It also adversely affected the available strength of the fighting force. Jelavich says that "it has been estimated that of the 400,000 enrolled janissaries, only 20,000 could be called upon in event of war."³⁴ This situation affected the

³²Ibid., p. 45.

³³Ibid., p. 43.

³⁴Peter F. Sugar and Donald W. Treadgold, eds., A History of East Central Europe (Seattle: University of

internal security and stability of the Ottoman Empire, and also had a bearing on Great Power aspirations.

Russia emerged as the most powerful continental force after Napoleon's defeat in 1814. The subsequent Congress of Vienna established a European system of order. This system was based on a balance of power among the Great Powers - Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia. This arrangement brought the longest period of peace Europe had known to this time. One of the alliances included the three eastern powers - Russia, Prussia, and Austria - and was called the Holy Alliance.

The Holy Alliance was a conservative coalition of monarchies that attempted to preserve the internal status quo against the revolutionary currents of liberalism and nationalism spreading throughout Europe. But the alliance was also skillfully used by Prince von Metternich of Austria to contain the territorial aspirations of an expansionist and powerful Russia.³⁵ Russia's involvement in the Balkans as a protector of the Orthodox Christian population was observed with great suspicion by Austria and Great Britain. Austria regarded the Balkans as part of its sphere of

Washington Press, 1977), p. 193, cited in Jelavich, History of the Balkans, Vol I., p. 48.

³⁵Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 83, 87.

influence and did not trust the Russians to be satisfied with that region alone. Great Britain, on the other hand, felt that Russian expansion into the Balkans would threaten its lines of communication to its colonies in the east.

So when the Greeks were in need of assistance during their bloody revolution in 1821, Russia was held in check by Britain and Austria because "England interpreted the Tsar's desire to protect the Christian population of the collapsing Ottoman Empire as the first stage of Russia's attempt to conquer Egypt."³⁶ The themes of balance and competition between the Great Powers would recur, centering on the Eastern Question. The drama included nationalist movements seeking independence in the Balkans, Great Power rivalries, and a crumbling Ottoman Empire. The combination of factors prevented an Orthodox Christian Russia from coming to the aid of a Balkan Orthodox Christian population under Ottoman rule. The outcome was a long, bloody struggle in the independence movements for Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria.

C. BALKAN HYPER-NATIONALISM

Bulgarian nationalism and the struggle for Macedonia and Thrace attracted Russia's involvement. Serbia and Bulgaria caught the attention of the popular Panslav movement in Russia. After Russia's defeat in the Crimean

³⁶Ibid., p. 89.

War, a means to carry out Russian imperialist designs in the Balkan region was established. These designs focused primarily on "pursuing the ancient Russian dream of gaining Constantinople and the Straits."³⁷ However, Serbia, due in part to Great Power politics, was later considered within the Austrian sphere of influence, and was instructed by the Russian government to seek assistance from that Great Power.³⁸

Bulgaria, on the other hand, began its nationalist struggle for independence much later than Greece and Serbia. This was due in part to its close proximity to the centralized power base of the Ottoman capital. Contrary to what might have been expected, the focus of the Bulgarian nationalist movement was not aimed at the Ottoman Turks, but at the Greeks and the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople. Bulgarian nationalists took this approach in their struggle for independence and the acquisition of Macedonia because the Greeks and the Greek language were predominant in the one factor setting apart the Christian population from the Turks in Macedonia - the Orthodox

³⁷Ibid., p. 93.

³⁸Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 359, and Evangelos Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia (New Rochelle, NY: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1993), p. 16.

Church. Church affiliation had a direct linkage to national consciousness, so that even ethnic Slavs considered themselves Greek.³⁹

Therefore, the Bulgarians demanded a national Church, and the Turks, recognizing the opportunity to divide the Balkan Christians and lessen the Greek influence, granted permission on February 28, 1870, to establish the Bulgarian Exarchate. This brought the level of competition for Macedonia between Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia to a stage not known before in Balkan nationalist movements. From this point on, Bulgarian nationalism and Russian imperialist aims would clash with the nationalist aims of Greece and Serbia in the multi-ethnic region of Macedonia. Russia had now found a "loyal Balkan protege who could be properly projected as heir to the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and the Aegean."⁴⁰

The Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878, which included the Russian -Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the subsequent San Stefano treaty, almost caused the realization of Russian and Bulgarian aims in the Balkans. The San Stefano treaty, negotiated by the Panslav Russian Ambassador Ignatiev, shifted the balance of power by the creation of a large,

³⁹Kofos, Nationalism and Communism, pp. 11-15.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 15.

autonomous Bulgaria. This treaty provided Bulgaria with most of Macedonia, Eastern Rumelia, and Bulgaria proper. This made Bulgaria the largest state in the Balkans, holding strategic invasion routes found in the Macedonian region, and key outlets to the Aegean Sea in Thrace.

Fortunately for Greece and Serbia, Great Britain and Austria would not allow the establishment of a Russian satellite in the Balkans that would possibly hinder Austrian expansion southward and British trade eastward. London and Vienna rejected the unilateral settlement made by the Russians. The Russians, fearing another European coalition like the one that opposed St. Petersburg in the Crimean War, accepted an invitation by Bismarck to settle the dispute in Berlin. The Congress of Berlin, meeting from June 13 to July 13 in 1878, modified the San Stefano treaty considerably. Macedonia was returned to the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria was to be split in two. North of the Balkan mountains would be an autonomous region under an elected Bulgarian prince. The area south of the Balkan mountains (eastern Rumelia) would fall under the direct military and political control of the Sultan. Austria was given the rights to occupy Bosnia and Hercegovina, and the Sanjak of Novi Pazar (a strip of territory between Serbia and Montenegro).

Although Russia and Bulgaria were deprived of their spoils, the damage had been done. Bulgaria now saw the San Stefano treaty as its *Magna Carta* and the frontiers of that treaty as its manifest destiny.⁴¹ In addition, as Douglas Dakin observes, it also caused great dissatisfaction among the Balkan nations and again focused their attention on the struggle for Macedonia:

Bulgaria, because it was a part of a prize; Serbia, because her principal expansion must be towards the southeast now that Austria had acquired the right to occupy and annex Bosnia and Herzegovina; and Greece, because of the numerous Slav-and Greek-speaking patriarchists who lived in that region.⁴²

The period following the Congress of Berlin has been characterized as a Balkan detente. Except for the Bulgarian annexation of Eastern Rumelia in 1885, the struggle for Macedonia shifted to nationalist organizations and underground activities that ranged from proselytizing and propaganda to terror. At first, these nationalist organizations formed along cultural and religious lines, with the apparent intention of deepening national consciousness. For instance, the Bulgarians founded the Cyril and Methodius Society in 1884; the Serbs established the Society of St. Sava in 1886; and the Greeks formed the

⁴¹Ibid., p. 16.

⁴²Dakin, Unification of Greece, p. 134.

National Society in 1894.⁴³ Evangelos Kofos says that the aims of the National Society "were to assist the Greek consciousness, and to prepare them--and Greece--for the eventuality of a war against Turkey."⁴⁴

By the early 1890's, this military emphasis became the means of choice among some nationalist groups. Small paramilitary units formed, which advocated the use of force to accomplish their unifying nationalist aims. In 1893, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) was formed. Its goal was to "gather into one entity all discontented elements in Macedonia and the area of the Aegean, regardless of nationality, in order to achieve, by means of revolution, complete political autonomy for these areas."⁴⁵

Although the IMRO's motto was "Macedonia for the Macedonians," it was quite apparent that its mainly Bulgarian membership desired Macedonian autonomy as a prelude to union with Bulgaria.⁴⁶ However, the Bulgarian

⁴³Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century, p. 93.

⁴⁴Kofos, Nationalism and Communism, p. 30.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 25.

⁴⁶For a detailed account of IMRO organization and objectives, see Dimitrije Djordjevic and Stephen Fischer-Galati, The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition, pp. 178-180; Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century, pp. 93-95; and Evangelos Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in

Government found it difficult to control the IMRO's revolutionary tactics, and made an attempt to install a new revolutionary organization in Macedonia that would conform with its manifest destiny--the reestablishment of the San Stefano treaty's *Greater Bulgaria*.

This new organization was the Macedonian External Organization or the Supremists. The Bulgarians believed that an autonomous Macedonian region would be annexed to the Bulgarian state just as the autonomous East Roumelia had been in 1885.⁴⁷

Operating with the support of the Bulgarian army and government, both groups caused a great deal of suffering and unrest in the Macedonian region. This anarchy stemmed from the disengagement of the Ottoman government and the Great Powers. The crumbling Ottoman government and army were not capable of restoring law and order, and the Great Powers were preoccupied with their own internal problems.

Finally, after a large scale revolt (the Iliden revolt) in August of 1903, the Turkish armed forces were able to defeat the rebels. This was a turning point in Greek and Serbian efforts to secure part of the Macedonian region. Confirming this shift, Kofos says:

Macedonia, pp. 25-28.

⁴⁷Wilkinson, Maps and Politics, p. 151.

The Greek Government clearly realised that Macedonia was in danger of being lost by default to the Bulgarians, and that neither the Great Powers nor the Ottomans could be trusted to safeguard the rights of the Greeks in the region. The moment had ripened for the Greek counter-offensive to take a concrete form. Thus, the crushing of the 'Iliden' uprising ushered in the 'Macedonian Struggle,' which in turn prepared the way for the liberation of Macedonia ten years later.⁴⁸

However, the revolutionary organization's defeat in 1903 did not put a stop to its activities in the Macedonian region. IMRO members regrouped and pursued their aim of "uniting all Macedonians in one state." This is a significant factor in the Balkan mind-set of perceptions and misperceptions. The Greeks consider the IMRO's support for the Greek and Slavic Communist forces during the Greek Civil War of 1946-1949 as an attempt to annex the Greek Macedonian territory. Greek perceptions of the IMRO have been influenced by this long history of a unifying Macedonian nationalism, which advocates a diaspora-annexing policy.⁴⁹ It is quite clear that Greece's reaction to FYROM's independence is related to the active involvement of the successor to IMRO, known as VMRO-DPMNE in FYROM's current domestic politics, and the danger Greece still perceives in the aspirations of the IMRO and its successor.

⁴⁸Kofos, Nationalism and Communism, p. 33.

⁴⁹Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism," p. 12.

As mentioned above, during the period following the Congress of Berlin, the Great Powers turned their attention away from the Eastern Question in the Balkans and turned inward, as in the case of Austria, which was preoccupied with its nationality problems, or pursued imperialist claims elsewhere, as Russia did in the Far East. However, this lull did not satisfy the appetites of Balkan nationalists. And like many Balkan disputes and irredentist claims throughout history, the solution was usually determined through war.

On October 8, 1912, the combined forces of Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro attacked the Ottoman Empire with an overwhelming numerical superiority, initiating the race to acquire the Macedonian and Thracian lands. The Bulgarians absorbed most of the major fighting in Thrace against most of the Turkish massed forces, while the Serbs pressed in a south-southeast direction and the Greeks moved north-northeast. The Turks could not contain this combined attack and were driven from their Balkan territories. Upon the consolidation of the victory, the Bulgarians found themselves the "odd man out," as Greece and Serbia had won in the race to occupy key terrain in Macedonia.

With Bulgaria not satisfied with its spoils of victory, it declared war on Greece and Serbia on June 16, 1913. This

second Balkan War lasted for approximately one month and was very costly for the Bulgarians. At the Treaty of Bucharest in August 1913, Greece and Serbia turned out to be the big winners. Greece acquired southern Macedonia and parts of Epirus, and Serbia received the central and northern Macedonian territory located on Greece's new northern border. Again, Bulgaria's hopes of consolidating the Macedonian region for itself were dashed. Bulgaria would ardently look for an opportunity to rectify the situation on its behalf, and such an opportunity was just around the corner.

This opportunity for the Bulgarians to fulfill their dream of securing the frontiers of the San Stefano treaty was provided during World War I. Unfortunately for the Bulgarians, they allied themselves with the losing side. With the defeat of Germany and the other Central Powers, Bulgaria again lost territory to the Greeks and Serbs, a loss formalized on this occasion in the Treaty of Neuilly (1919). In addition, the Bulgarians had to pay a war indemnity and limit the size of their military and security forces. This treaty was humiliating for the Bulgarians, and caused deep resentment and enmity toward the Greeks and the Serbs.

The victors, on the other hand, took full advantage of the right to self-determination, which President Wilson espoused in his Fourteen Points for Europe. The outcome created new ethnic mixes and new borders that only fueled the fire of irredentism with those who were not satisfied with their boundaries.

D. YUGOSLAV POLITICAL MUTATION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR MACEDONIA

World War II had similar consequences for the Bulgarians, as they sided again with the Germans and the losing side. However, a new circumstance emerged in the struggle for Macedonia at the conclusion of World War II. As Evangelos Kofos points out, "with the termination of the war, the initiative in dictating the course of Macedonian developments passed from the Bulgarians to the Yugoslavs. Under Tito, it was Yugoslavia's turn to strike for a one-sided solution to the Macedonian problem."⁵⁰ This had to be done with caution since Yugoslav Macedonia still had a pro-Bulgarian national consciousness, owing to the years of Bulgarian propaganda and indoctrination from the 1870's until the end of the second Balkan War in 1913.

Not only was this a delicate maneuver with a pro-Bulgarian population, but Tito also had to deal with this

⁵⁰Kofos, Nationalism and Communism, p. 292.

sensitive situation cautiously because of his intentions to curb Serbian dominance and hegemony in the region and within the federation of Yugoslavia, and to acquire the Macedonian region. In the end, Tito manipulated the situation brilliantly. He managed geographically to slice away the Macedonian territory obtained by the Serbs during the Balkan and World Wars, and to transform it into the new People's Republic of Macedonia. To add legitimacy to this new republic, Tito asserted that the locally spoken Bulgarian dialect was a new "Macedonian" language. Tito also established a Macedonian Orthodox Church. This represented a break with the past Serbian, Greek, and Bulgarian Orthodox Churches and provided a new "Macedonian" national consciousness through religious affiliation in the same manner as the other churches had done in the past. A mutation of history was also accomplished by linking the "Macedonian" people with the ancient Macedonian Empire and Alexander the Great.

Finally, Tito instilled an irredentist vision within the new republic with the provocative declaration of the right of all the Macedonian people to unite. In a speech given in Skopje in the People's Republic of Macedonia, on October 11, 1945, Tito said:

We will never renounce the right of the Macedonian people to be united. This is our principle and we do

not abandon our principles for any temporary sympathies. We are not indifferent to the fate of our brothers in Aegean Macedonia and our thoughts are with them. We will steadfastly defend the principle that all Macedonians must be united in their own country.⁵¹

This proposition was basically understood by the Greeks and Bulgarians as a Yugoslav Macedonian threat to annex Greek and Bulgarian Macedonia.

In fact, Tito's aims of unifying the Macedonian region and securing an Aegean outlet played an important role in his support of the communist forces in the Greek Civil War. Tito believed that a communist government in Greek Macedonia would be willing to relinquish territory to Yugoslav Macedonia in exchange for military assistance. Confirming this interpretation of Tito's intentions, C.M. Woodhouse says that:

The communist-led Democratic Army was supported from Tito's territory by military supplies, training, and recruits, and by safe harbors north of the Greek frontier, which the Greek National Army was debarred from crossing. By the end of the civil war, half the manpower of the Democratic Army were Slavs recruited either from Tito's Makedonija or from the Slav-Macedonian minority in Greece...There is no doubt that if Tito had had his way, Greater Macedonia would have been established with its capital as Salonika, the port on the Mediterranean that Stalin also desired.⁵²

However, with the Tito-Cominform split and the entry of the United States into the Greek Civil War in 1947, the

⁵¹Ibid., p. 152.

⁵²C.M. Woodhouse, "Recognizing 'Macedonia' Defies History," Christian Science Monitor, 28 October 1992, p. 19.

momentum turned in favor of the Greek government. Two years later, the civil war ended, with most of the defeated forces leaving Greece for Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania. Along with the defeat of the Greek communist forces (Greek Communist Party-KKE), and the Slavic-speaking forces (National Liberation Front-NOF) that were organized and manned by Slavs from Yugoslav and Greek Macedonia, came the defeat of Tito's vision of annexing Greek Macedonia.

From 1949, when the Greek communist forces were defeated, until 1991, when Yugoslavia began to dissolve, the Macedonian question was put on hold within the East-West, bipolar struggle dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. Nationalist visions and dissatisfactions regarding borders were sacrificed at the altar of stability within the Soviet sphere of influence that ruled a major part of the Balkans for nearly forty-five years. Since the breakdown of that international security order, the world has become aware of long-standing dissatisfactions regarding borders between neighboring countries and former Yugoslav republics in the Balkans and the revival of old patterns of conflict. Nearly every Balkan country has irredentist claims against its neighbors.

E. FYROM's "VACUUM EFFECT" IN THE RENEWED STRUGGLE FOR
MACEDONIA

Once again, the Macedonian region is at the forefront of competition and irredentism in the southern Balkans. A weak FYROM has emerged from the Yugoslav breakup as a great temptation to its neighbors. Not surprisingly, Bulgaria was one of the first to recognize FYROM's independence in 1991. Confirming the fact that their vision for a "Greater Bulgaria" has not faded, the Bulgarians in 1991 changed their national day to March 3rd. The significance of this day is that on March 3, 1878, the Treaty of San Stefano was signed, granting Bulgaria almost the entire Macedonian region.⁵³

Not wanting to be left out, the Serbs also have claims to what they call "South Serbia." With the justification of an allegedly oppressed Serb minority of approximately 500,000 in FYROM,⁵⁴ and with Serbia's aspirations to recover its lost territory, the Serbian President proposed a partition of FYROM between Greece and Serbia. The Greek Prime Minister is reported to have declined the offer and to

⁵³Christopher Hitchens, "Minority Report: Greece and Macedonia," The Nation, May 2, 1994, v258, n17, p. 583(1).

⁵⁴"Greece Will Not Go to War Over Serbia," Zagreb VECERNJI LIST, 29 Jun 1994 (FBIS-EEU-94-129, 29 Jun 1994), pp. 6-7.

have reported the Serbian suggestion to the European Union.⁵⁵ In the west, Albania poses a serious threat to FYROM's territorial integrity due to the large ethnic Albanian minority in FYROM (some estimate between 20 to 40% of the population). For example, Duncan M. Perry says that "the Albanian liberation movement has formed a terrorist offshoot in western Macedonia called Unikom. This organization advocates the use of violence to resolve the Albanian question in Macedonia."⁵⁶ Besides the territorial claims in western FYROM, Albanian nationalists also envision a larger Albanian state -- consisting of Albania proper, parts of Montenegro, and the Serbian-controlled province of Kosovo, where 90% of the population is ethnic Albanian.

Greece, on the other hand, has waged an unsuccessful battle to prevent the recognition of FYROM by the European Union, the United States, and the United Nations. Greece's efforts and disappointments in this respect have fueled the fire of competitive hyper-nationalism and have added to the "spiraling effect." Greece and FYROM, have used ambiguous assurances and provocative gestures. Both appear to be engaging in alliance-building with regional powers.

⁵⁵Duncan M. Perry, "Macedonia: A Balkan Problem and a European Dilemma," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, no. 25, 19 June 1992, p. 44.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 38.

The historical antecedents in the struggle for Macedonia point to the recurrence of irredentist claims and the rise of hyper-nationalism when the strategic region of Macedonia is weak in relation to its neighbors. What was true in the late 19th and early 20th centuries about the "vacuum effect" of Macedonia is true today. FYROM's weakness is currently a great temptation to its neighbors. And with all of its neighbors, except perhaps for Greece, claiming FYROM or parts of it as a piece of their historic, greater empire, the situation has become extremely dangerous and explosive. As the predicament currently stands, only war between the dissatisfied parties or intervention by a third party that is willing to use its power or prestige could settle the disputes and claims over Macedonia. However, in this century alone the precedent has been set: war has won over diplomacy in the various rounds of the struggle for Macedonia by the score of five to nothing.

III. THE "SPIRALING EFFECT" OF BALKAN HYPER-NATIONALISM

These historical antecedents and the anarchic setting of this region have molded a strategic culture in which ethno-national groups view their neighbors as threatening. According to John J. Mearsheimer, in such a setting "benevolent nationalism frequently turns into ugly hypernationalism--the belief that other nations or nation-states are both inferior and threatening and must therefore be dealt with harshly."⁵⁷ Chauvinist mythmaking has a tendency to follow such a belief system, which allows states to rationalize their provocations on the basis of moral and legal rights.

Many of these hyper-nationalist tendencies and the consequent political implications stem, as has been suggested, from a strategic culture common to the Balkan region.⁵⁸ The strategic culture of the Greeks has been deeply influenced by the Byzantine empire, by the period of Ottoman domination (1453-1830), by the struggle for independence in the 19th century, and by wars and chronic economic and political insecurity during the 20th century.

⁵⁷John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), p. 21.

⁵⁸For a definition of "strategic culture" by Ken Booth see footnote 4.

Another factor influencing Greek strategic culture is the dominant value of *philotimo* or "love of honor." This concept of *philotimo* in Greece does not have an equivalent value in West European countries. In Greece, *philotimo* measures "a man's worth in terms of his success in fulfilling kinship obligations and in protecting the extended family from real or imaginary threats emanating from a hostile physical and human environment."⁵⁹ In contrast, in countries such as Britain and France, the dominant value system places an emphasis on individualism and man's responsibility and loyalty to the nation-state. In this West European value system, individuals are judged by their personal integrity. However, in Greece, individuals are judged on whether they have *philotimo*.⁶⁰

As a result, Greeks tend to view the world in Hobbesian terms of struggle and uncertainty.⁶¹ S. Victor Papacosma describes how the individual Greek has endured this outlook

⁵⁹Adamantia Pollis, "The Impact of Traditional Cultural Patterns on Greek Politics," The Greek Review of Social Research, Vol. 29, 1977, p. 3, quoted in S. Victor Papacosma, "Politics and Culture in Greece," Institute for Social Research (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1988), p. 6.

⁶⁰Adamantia Pollis, "Political Implications of the Modern Greek Concept of Self," British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 16, 1965, p. 34.

⁶¹Papacosma, "Politics and Culture," p. 1.

and its subsequent results by relying:

On an ingroup composed primarily of the extended family, friends, friends of friends, and those people concerned with his welfare, for security and advancement....[and] in the hostile world, successes, failures, conflicts, and relationships with people and authorities are viewed in ingroup-outgroup terms.⁶²

Given a perception of the world as permeated with "real and fabricated conspiracies" extending from a hostile environment (outgroup), the Greek mindset "naturally breeds distrust, suspicion, and rumors."⁶³ The experience of approximately 400 years of Ottoman occupation, a bloody struggle for independence, and six wars during this century, which involved behind-the-scenes exploitation by the Great Powers, helps to explain the fatalistic psyche of the Greeks and their sense of vulnerability to the threat or use of force. This may also explain why Greece spends more on defense as a percentage of GNP than any other NATO country, including the United States.

Partly because of this underlying Balkan strategic culture and value system, hyper-nationalism has led to a "spiral model" pattern of conflict in the Macedonian region.⁶⁴ It appears that the strategic culture of the Balkans and the hyper-nationalist tendencies in the region

⁶²Ibid., pp. 1, 9.

⁶³Ibid., p. 7.

⁶⁴Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," p. 24.

create a strong propensity for political elites to embrace a "spiral model" pattern of behavior in international relations. The very policies that spiral theorists believe are inclined to raise the level of tension in disputes-- "development of potent and flexible armed forces, a willingness to fight for issues of low intrinsic value, [and] avoidance of any appearances of weakness"⁶⁵--have been implemented in the Macedonian region today.

The "spiral model," as described by Robert Jervis, is a theory based on the "anarchic setting of international relations," and is a result of "living in a Hobbesian state of nature." Jervis says that "in such a world without a sovereign, each state is protected only by its own strength. Furthermore, statesmen realize that, even if others currently harbor no aggressive designs, there is nothing to guarantee that they will not later develop them."⁶⁶ In this anarchic setting of the spiral model, an act of self-protection by one state may be viewed as offensive by another and may lead to an arms race, or worse, to a preemptive attack.⁶⁷

⁶⁵Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 84.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 62.

⁶⁷Ibid., pp. 63-67.

The "Hobbesian state of nature" is, of course, omnipresent in international relations, but may be qualified by power configurations of remarkable stability that provide a measure of order. In the Balkans, such order has usually been imposed by outside powers. The withdrawal--or perceived disengagement--of such powers since the end of the Cold War in 1989-1991 has made the anarchic "state of nature" in the Balkans more fluid and has made Balkan strategic culture a stronger determinant of political behavior.

This type of behavior and assessment by political elites and statesmen is most often influenced by the traumas, wars, and other experiences that have been weathered by the state (or nation) in its past. Perceptions, images, and theories may then be developed from these past experiences. Frequently, ambiguous information and complex events are filtered through these existing theories, with the outcome being a distorted perception from a preconceived expectation.⁶⁸

It is not surprising that Balkan strategic culture lends itself to the type of distorted processing of incoming information found in the spiral model--that is, a conflict-exacerbating exchange of messages and, at least in some

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 472.

cases, misperceptions aggravating mutual mistrusts. The peoples of the Balkans have not recovered from the traumas they have experienced over the centuries. Concerning this factor, Stephen Van Evera writes that "the scope of the dangers posed by past crimes is a function, in part, of whether these crimes are remembered, and whether victims can attach responsibility for crimes to groups that are still present."⁶⁹

An example of this factor is present in the conflict raging in other parts of the former Yugoslavia. For instance, the Serbian populations in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina reacted in part to their memories of Croatian nationalism during World War II and remembered in particular their fellow Serbs who were killed by the Ustashi. Even the remembrance of their defeat by the Ottomans on the Kosovo battlefield in 1389 was invoked by Serbian political elites to instill nationalist sentiments in the Serbian people.

The cultures and religions of East and West meet in the Balkans. The contrasting Judeo-Christian tenets of an "eye for an eye"⁷⁰ and "love your enemies"⁷¹ found in the Old and New Testaments confront and struggle with each other for

⁶⁹Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism," p. 24.

⁷⁰Exodus 21:24

⁷¹Matthew 5:44

supremacy. Describing Greece's cultural foundation and quite possibly the Balkan culture as well, Nikos Kazantzakis wrote:

Following the tradition of reason and empirical inquiry, the West bounds forward to conquer the world; the East, prodded by frightening subconscious forces, likewise darts forward to conquer the world. Greece is placed in the middle; it is the world's geographical and spiritual crossroads.⁷²

It is difficult for Westerners to comprehend Balkan manners and culture, especially when Westerners expect a response that mirrors their own cultural traits.

Many historical traumas in the Macedonian region and throughout the Balkans are still vivid memories. The Bulgarian initiative to acquire the Macedonian region in 1878, the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, World War I and II, the Greek-Turkish Wars of 1922-1923, and the Greek Civil War in 1946-1949 are all examples of open wounds that have not healed. Balkan nations and states have been scarred by these wars, occupations, and subsequent assimilation programs. This sensitivity to past traumas may explain why conflicts surrounding the struggle for the Macedonian region have often led to "self-fulfilling prophecies and the spirals of misperception and hostility."⁷³

⁷²Nikos Kazantzakis, Report to Greco (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965), quoted in Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 231.

⁷³Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," p. 484.

Being locked in a "spiraling" relationship may also explain why Greece and many other Balkan countries, which are influenced by a similar strategic culture, seek other means to insure security for their national borders and institutions. Since these states live in a "Hobbesian state of nature" where no sovereign exists, there is a great danger that "the belief that there is a high degree of real conflict will create a conflict that is no longer illusory."⁷⁴ It appears that this perception (or misperception) in Balkan politics comes to the fore when external powers, such as Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire during most of the 19th century and NATO and the Soviet empire during the Cold War, are no longer imposing a quasi-peace on the Balkans and when there is a threat to the delicate balance of power in the Macedonian region. Both conditions seem to have emerged since the breakup of the former Soviet Union and of the former Yugoslavia in 1991.

A. BALKAN BALANCE OF POWER

Currently, the balance of power in the Balkans has not shifted to the hegemonic advantage of one country or coalition. However, a potential problem has arisen because of the "vacuum effect" created by the weakness of the FYROM, and because of the shift in the strategic balance of power

⁷⁴Jervis, Perception and Misperception, p. 77.

that would result if Serbia, or Bulgaria, or even Greece filled this void. Since 40% of the strategically important Macedonian region is found in present day FYROM, the acquisition of this territory would enhance the geostrategic prospects of a potential hegemon in the Balkans.

Because the FYROM's military weakness could tempt aggressors, this is a realistic possibility. As a result of the heightened state of hyper-nationalism and tension in the relations among the Balkan powers (Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Serbia), deliberate moves against hegemons or threatening alignments have been initiated in response to real or perceived threats. This posturing centers on the historic animosities and differences in the geopolitical aims of Greece, Serbia, and to a lesser extent, Bulgaria, with Turkey's role and interests in the Balkans.

The Turkish armed forces total over 500,000 active duty personnel, with over one million in the reserves. This makes it the second largest armed force in NATO.⁷⁵ In addition, the modernization of Turkey's armaments and the receipt of CFE-surplus equipment have made the Turkish armed forces numerically and qualitatively superior to any others in the Balkans.⁷⁶ Despite the end of the Cold War and the

⁷⁵Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, Turkey's New Geopolitics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 118.

⁷⁶Ibid., pp. 119-121.

movement of former Soviet forces eastward, Turkey still maintains a center of gravity toward Europe rather than Asia and the Mid-East.⁷⁷

This strategic focus may change with new threats coming from the Caucasus, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Kurdish minority in southeastern Turkey. But so far there has been no change in the size and quality of Turkish forces in Thrace. Ian O. Lesser suggests that Turkey has not repostured its armed forces in Thrace "because of the perceived value of Turkish military superiority in deterring the mistreatment of Muslim minorities in Bulgaria, Greece, and elsewhere in the Balkans."⁷⁸ An estimated 80,000 ethnic Turks reside in FYROM, along with Muslim ethnic Albanians in FYROM, the province of Kosovo, and Albania proper. This is certainly a strong consideration for the Turkish government, because it has received pressure from its domestic population and from the Muslim world to take the lead as the protector of the Balkan Muslims. The main factor influencing the Turkish force levels in Thrace is, however, power politics--the need to prevent the emergence of a Balkan hegemon that would threaten Turkish leverage and

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 114.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 114.

interests in the Balkans.⁷⁹

B. BALKAN ALLIANCES AND THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS

To counter and compete with Turkey's military superiority and to maintain its own power position, Greece has embarked upon an armaments race that has lasted since the 1950's, and that has been largely supported by U.S. equipment and financing. Greece has also relied upon its position within the NATO alliance. With the threat of a Russian invasion diminished, and the new roles of NATO in international security still being worked out, the effectiveness and commitment of NATO partners appears to be diminished as well.

The combination of all the factors mentioned above--Balkan hyper-nationalism, the "vacuum effect" of a weak FYROM, the changes in security arrangements in Europe, the strategic culture of the Balkan powers, and the military superiority and interests of Turkey--helps to explain how the states within the Macedonian region have become locked into a "spiraling" relationship. These factors have also contributed to the rebuilding of traditional Balkan

⁷⁹The militant Islamic Welfare Party now controls Ankara, Istanbul and other Turkish cities, and threatens Turkey's 71 years of secular leanings. For a detailed account see "Muslim Party's Growth Posing Challenge to Turkey's Secular Heritage," New York Times, November 30, 1994, p. A8.

alliances. The situation has also led to more provocative actions and threats that undermine prospects for a diplomatic settlement to the claims and ambitions of several Balkan countries.

This predicament is where Greece finds itself today. Since the recognition of FYROM by the United Nations Security Council on April 7, 1993, Greece has closed its northern border with FYROM. Moreover, alliances have been formed that parallel those in the early Balkan Wars of 1912-13. Describing these alliances, Robert D. Kaplan says that:

There is the north-south Byzantine configuration made up of the Orthodox Christian world: Greece, Serbia, Russia, and even Romania, where water-sharing agreements and a resurgence of Orthodox-related fascism are pulling it closer to the Serbian orbit. Then there is the east-west Muslim alliance of Turks and Albanians, both in Albania-proper as well as in Kosovo and Macedonia. As in the past, this grouping is backed by Croatia.⁸⁰

These alliances are not just hypothetical, but are currently being discussed openly by Balkan political elites.⁸¹ An example of cooperation among Orthodox countries is the creation of a Greek-Russian religious and cultural association. This association includes the clergy,

⁸⁰Robert D. Kaplan, "Ground Zero," New Republic, August 2, 1993, p. 15.

⁸¹For further accounts regarding Balkan alliances see "Divisions in Foreign Policy Outlook," Athens TA NEA, 3 January 94 (FBIS-WEU-95-014, 23 January 94, and "Against Orthodox Bloc," Vienna PROFIL, 21 Mar 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-055, 21 Mar 94), p. 72.

scholars, businessmen, doctors, lawyers, journalists, and members of youth clubs.⁸²

It is not surprising that these two alliances intersect in the culturally divided land of FYROM, which now can be seen as a possible battleground between diverging civilizations. These diverging civilizations in the Balkans meet at what Samuel P. Huntington describes as cultural fault lines, which form a separation between the Catholic-Protestant West, the Orthodox East, and the large Muslim populations.⁸³ This new political system of relations in Europe, based on cultural fault lines (religion, language, and nationality) and not on ideology, is what Huntington says is "replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed."⁸⁴ Concerning Huntington's hypothesis, Kaplan writes that "the Balkans, a powder keg for nation-state war at the beginning of the twentieth century, could be a powder keg for a cultural war at the turn of the twenty first:

⁸²"Orthodox Greek-Russian Association," Athens I KATHIMERINI, 15 August 93 (FBIS-WEU-93-376, 25 September 93).

⁸³Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, pp. 29-30.

⁸⁴Ibid.

between Orthodox Christianity...and the House of Islam."⁸⁵

The significance of these alignments and formations is vital in the understanding of Balkan conflicts today, since they are embedded in Balkan history and culture dating back to the 4th century A.D. Three milestones in history have contributed to the cultural fault lines found in the Balkans and the present appeals to form alliances along these lines. The first occurred in 324 A.D. when the Roman Emperor Constantine decided to move the capital eastward to the city of Byzantium. It was at Byzantium that Constantine built the new capital, Constantinople, which was named after himself. Timothy Ware says that "the motives for this move were in part economic and political, but they were also religious: the old Rome was too deeply stained with pagan associations to form the center of the Christian Empire which he had in mind."⁸⁶ This was the first step in the east-west division of the Roman Empire, and the first step to separate the two along religious and cultural lines.

The second major separation occurred approximately fifty years after the death of the Emperor Constantine and after the death of his successor, Theodosius I, in 395 A.D.

⁸⁵Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, p. 62.

⁸⁶Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 27.

In that year the empire was divided in two parts, each going to one of Theodosius's two sons. Commenting on this division, John V.A. Fine says that:

Though in theory they were colleagues and it was still one empire, from here on the empire was never united in fact. The two different civilizations developed on their own: Latin and Greek (eventually each with its own Christian church). After the Slavic invasions of the late sixth and seventh centuries cut off east-west communications ...these differences became even greater, making it impossible for the two to agree on certain major issues again.⁸⁷

Despite attempts to mend disagreements between Rome and Constantinople, the final split came in the summer of 1054 A.D. It was in this year that the "great schism" occurred between the Orthodox east and the Latin west. Thus the cultural lines became more cemented, with the Balkans becoming the border or buffer zone between the two civilizations.

The third and last event that helped to define today's Balkan cultural fault lines was the Ottoman conquest, which led to new Great Power rivalries in the Balkans. In 1453, Constantinople fell to the Ottomans, as did the last Emperor of Rome. Shortsightedness on the part of the Christian leaders of Europe and their lack of consensus would soon result in dire consequences for the continent. Barbara

⁸⁷John V.A. Fine, The Early Medieval Balkans (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983), p. 15.

Jelavich says that:

The collapse of the Byzantine state and the taking of the great imperial city was an event of tremendous significance. The chief citadel of Eastern Christianity and the heir to Roman power and splendor was occupied by a Muslim Turkish conqueror. It was now to become the capital of a new empire, which was based on quite different principles.⁸⁸

Less than one hundred years later, the Ottomans would lay siege to Vienna (1529) and threaten the Austrian Empire. This competition for supremacy and territory in southeastern Europe would characterize the Balkan situation until the 20th century. The main contenders included the Muslim Ottoman Empire, the Catholic Austrian Empire, and the Orthodox Russian Empire.

Since these Great Power rivalries further strengthened cultural fault lines, alignments by Balkan countries subsequently followed along this pattern. Not surprisingly, these same alignments can be observed forming today. With regard to FYROM, the alignments along cultural fault lines are unquestionable. The Orthodox countries of Greece and Serbia have allied themselves against FYROM, but not for identical reasons. For Greece, an apparent usurpation of history and culture and the threat of irredentist claims by FYROM are at the core of the matter. In contrast, the Serbs

⁸⁸Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, p. 32.

have their own irredentist claims on what they consider as "southern Serbia," which was annexed from them by Tito in 1944.

Opposing this Orthodox alliance is a Muslim alliance headed by the Ottoman successor state, Turkey. Allied with Turkey in the struggle for dominance in the Macedonian region are the Albanians, of which 70% are Muslim. Along with Turkey, Albania is now a full participant in the Islamic Conference Organization and is receiving financial assistance from other Islamic countries.⁸⁹ In addition, 20-40% of the population in FYROM are ethnic Albanians, as well as 90% of the population in Kosovo, and both these groups are overwhelmingly Muslim. The Albanians have the highest population growth rate in Europe, a circumstance that enhances prospects for greater Muslim influence.⁹⁰ The Greeks in particular feel threatened by the prospect of being surrounded by Muslims, and would prefer to have an Orthodox Serbia as a northern neighbor rather than what they perceive as a menacing "Islamic arc."

⁸⁹For more information regarding Islam and Albania, see Frances Trix, "The resurfacing of Islam in Albania," East European Quarterly, Winter 1994, and Larry Luxner, "Islamic resurgence in Albania," The Middle East, December 1992.

⁹⁰Fuller and Lesser, Turkey's New Geopolitics, pp. 147-148.

Not surprisingly, the odd man out in this equation of Balkan alliances is Bulgaria. Bulgaria has had a long tradition of postponing alliance decisions, with a view to making choices that will benefit Bulgarian ambitions. Although considered an Orthodox country, Bulgaria's policies have been influenced more by its assessments of its national interests than by its cultural ties with Orthodox countries. For example, when the medieval Bulgarian King Boris converted to Christianity in the 9th century A.D., he entertained the notion of accepting a Frankish mission (from the Latin Church in Rome) and alliance instead of the Orthodox Church in Constantinople. Boris eventually was persuaded and was baptized by the Orthodox Church, but only after the Byzantines launched an armed force toward Bulgaria.⁹¹

In both World Wars, Bulgaria sided with the Central and Axis Powers led by Germany. The Government in Sofia favored this alliance because it provided the best opportunity to acquire the Macedonian region and fulfill its desire for a "Greater Bulgaria." Bulgaria has coveted this region ever since losing this nationalist dream by the decisions made by the Great Powers in the Treaty of Berlin (1878). If Bulgarians are still motivated by their "manifest destiny"

⁹¹Fine, The Early Medieval Balkans, pp. 118-119.

of regaining the "Greater Bulgaria" afforded to them in the San Stefano Treaty of 1878, which current nationalist indications confirm, then the Bulgarians will ally themselves with the power that appears most likely to be able to help them achieve their objectives. This power will probably be Turkey, since Greece and Serbia would not accept a balance of power shift to Bulgaria's advantage.

C. THE REEMERGENCE OF GREAT POWER POLITICS

Great Power politics within the European Union play a role in this conflict concerning the Macedonian question and the Balkans. Since the end of the Cold War, the pressure has increased to replace the old bipolar political system with a new one that more accurately reflects the current situation. The disappearance of the Soviet threat has removed the single most important unifying factor in European security affairs. No clear common interest has appeared to unite the reemerging national interests of European nation states, except for the inertia of institutions such as the EU and NATO.

European security would be endangered if NATO evolved from a successful collective defense arrangement to a support organization for a collective security pact with an ill-defined threat to focus on. Within a collective security pact, members would be expected to resist every

aggressor since everyone's security interests would be affected by any aggression on the continent. This would place the once unifying external focus of collective defense on the internal processes and military policies of each nation-state within an abstract collective security arrangement. However, an arrangement of this kind in Europe would ignore the Clausewitzian premise of the "paradoxical trinity." Concerning the "paradoxical trinity," Clausewitz wrote that:

The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone.⁹²

In his theory on war, Clausewitz argued that only with an equilibrium between the government, the armed forces, and the people can victory be realized to its fullest potential. These three elements working together are so significant, Clausewitz argued, that "a theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless."⁹³ An abstract collective security arrangement in Europe would ignore the

⁹²Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Sir Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 89.

⁹³Ibid.

element of the people in the "paradoxical trinity" and the "passions that are to be kindled in war."

An expectation of cooperation among NATO members regarding collective security operations under United Nations auspices would be unrealistic in this perspective, since popular sentiments differ in the member nations. Such operations would only stress intra-alliance differences all the more. NATO's support for the United Nations involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a good example of this point. NATO has for the first time offered "out of area" military support to a collective security arrangement such as the United Nations. This has magnified the divergence of opinion between NATO members on the belligerents involved, and has helped cause a fractured response to the conflict that is raging in this region.

Other obstacles have surfaced that are now eroding political, economic and military cohesion in Western Europe. These obstacles have taken the form of unilateral decisions that only highlight differences between NATO and EU nation states. Due to the absence of a clear unifying threat, Germany's ambassador to NATO says that "today, individual alliance partners or groups have greater freedom to push through their interests, and NATO is instrumentalised for this purpose...As a result we see a blurring of the

partners' stance that was previously held and determined jointly."⁹⁴ Germany's unilateral insistence on recognizing Croatia and Slovenia, over British and French objections, illustrates this tendency to pursue national interests over alliance consensus.⁹⁵ Leaders in Germany's CDU, one of the parties in the governing coalition, have also proposed a two-tiered plan of economic integration that could make some countries "second-class members of the Union."⁹⁶ In addition, the United States decision to honor but not enforce the military embargo of Bosnia opened a huge rift between Washington's policy and that of its European allies.⁹⁷

Another factor may erode European cohesion--uncertainty about continued U.S. security commitments in Europe. More than two-thirds of the approximately 340,000 U.S. military personnel present in Europe in 1990 have been removed. With the U.S. Government split between domestic priorities and

⁹⁴Baron Herman von Richthofen, "Cracks are appearing in the alliance," Financial Times, December 3, 1994

⁹⁵"U.N. Yields to Germany on Yugoslavia, Following Lead of France and Britain," New York Times, December 16, 1991, p. A12.

⁹⁶Stephen Kinzer, "German Plan for European Union Brings Protests," New York Times, September 4, 1994, p. A4.

⁹⁷"Clinton Defends Halting Bosnia Arms Embargo Enforcement," New York Times, November 15, 1994, p. A7.

strategic concerns,⁹⁸ United States reliability and commitment are now being questioned by the European allies.

For instance, Baron Herman von Richthofen says that:

France is accusing the U.S. of defacto non-enforcement of surveillance of the arms embargo, and is demanding a comprehensive evaluation of all embargo infringements at sea, on land and in the air, in the apparent expectation that this will show the unreliability of the U.S.⁹⁹

Therefore, in Europe, there is a great temptation to return to the multipolar political system of the past. In fact, Great Power alliances reminiscent of past wars have reemerged, and have called the European Union's solidarity into question. Robert D. Kaplan suggests that two alliances have formed that are similar to World War II coalitions.¹⁰⁰ He says that the alliances include Germany, Austria, Italy and Turkey (the old Axis-Central power arrangement) on the one hand, and Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States on the other. Kaplan concludes that "whatever the reasons, as on previous occasions in this century, the same

⁹⁸An amendment offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts in the U.S. House of Representatives linked U.S. troop strength in Europe with NATO member contribution levels. For a detailed account, see U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, Amendment Offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts, May 19, 1994, pp. H3735-H3746.

⁹⁹Baron Herman von Richthofen, "Cracks are appearing in the alliance," Financial Times, December 3, 1994, p. 3.

¹⁰⁰Robert Kaplan, "Ground Zero," New Republic, August 2, 1993, p. 15.

people are supporting the same people, proof of how geography and the mysteries of culture can triumph over mere politics."¹⁰¹

Have the past alliances, described above, and the cultural similarities actually supplanted the European Union's political solidarity? Kaplan's thesis has yet to be proven correct, but these political alignments may explain the coolness of some European Union members, especially Germany, concerning Greece's claims about the Macedonian question.

Great Britain and France have both formally recognized FYROM. However, of the four major powers in the European Union (Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy), only Great Britain and France have consistently supported Greece throughout its modern history. From the beginning of Greece's movement toward independence in the early nineteenth century, the British and French have offered assistance in various ways, such as "the founding of the London Greek committee in 1823, the raising of the first Greek loan in England, the arrival of British philhellenes in Greece, and the French military mission in 1884."¹⁰²

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²Dakin, The Unification of Greece, pp. 52,145.

The relationship was deepened by the sacrifices shared by Britain, France, and Greece during the two World Wars. This shared history and commitment to similiar political ideals have also been important because most Balkan states rely heavily on a patron-client system for protection. Until 1947 and the advent of the Truman Doctrine, Britain was expected to protect and safeguard the Hellenic Republic of Greece. After 1947 and until recently, Greece looked to the United States for such protection.

In contrast, Greece and Germany fought on opposite sides during the two World Wars, and Greece was even attacked and occupied by German armed forces during World War II. However, these facts are not the primary explanation for the recent Greek-German discord. The reasons behind their impaired relationship include the recent renewal of their traditional political and cultural alliances within the Balkans, their competing economic interests in the region, and Greece's continued economic strain on the European Union.

As mentioned above, Greece has effectively allied itself with Serbia, at least on a political level (No formal treaty of alliance has been made public). This is a traditional relationship, based on shared national interests and culture. The Greek-Serbian partnership first took shape

in the nineteenth century, when both countries were fighting for independence from the Ottoman Empire. The partnership continued in the twentieth century during the Balkan and World Wars, and has now resurfaced as an important strategic association.

The Serbian-Russian relationship is also grounded in historic and cultural ties. Serbians and Russians speak a similar Slavic language and are closely linked by the Eastern Orthodox Christian faith. Furthermore, both have a close historical association in the pan-Slav movement of the 19th century. Russia came to the aid of Serbia in the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), and Russia sided with Serbia against Austria-Hungary and Germany in World War I. It is worth recalling that Russia, after two humiliating defeats (the Crimean War and the Russo-Japanese War), turned to the Balkans and to pan-Slavism for its new geopolitical pursuits and ideology.

A similar nationalist pan-Slav movement is again gripping a prostrate Russia, as she seeks a new identity after the Cold War. As in the past, Russia is again embracing a foreign policy that is anti-Western in tone and that highlights cultural affinities in the Balkans. Duncan M. Perry says that "in Russia, pan-Slavic rhetoric is being articulated by conservative politicians, legislators, and

others who shape public opinion, and it can be seen as one aspect of reemergent Russian nationalism."¹⁰³ Russia's pan-Slavism has taken the form of support for the Serbian position in the Yugoslav conflict. For instance, in March 1994, the lower house of Russia's legislature, the State Duma, voted 280 to 2 in favor of lifting Russia's embargo on Serbia.¹⁰⁴ Russian "volunteer battalions" and mercenaries are reported to be fighting on behalf of Serbia in Bosnia, and Russian newspapers are imploring Russians to assist their Slav brothers in Serbia.¹⁰⁵

Besides their ethnic links, the Russians and Serbs have a cultural bond that has reemerged as a powerful force since the collapse of the Soviet system. It is within the Russian and Serbian Orthodox Churches that a unifying nationalist identity has been preserved throughout the era of communism. About the Russian Orthodox Church, James H. Billington says that:

With the collapse of the world's first atheist state, the historic religion of Russia has emerged as the central cultural force in the country's new national

¹⁰³Duncan M. Perry, "Serbian-Russian Relations: Pragmatic and Politic," RFE/RL Research Report, March 19, 1993, p. 2.

¹⁰⁴Laurie Laird, "Shared history: Serbia's ties to Russia," Europe: Magazine of the European Community, June 1994, p. 19.

¹⁰⁵Suzanne Crow, "Russia Adopts a More Active Policy," RFE/RL Research Report, March 19, 1993, p. 5.

self-consciousness. As a cohering ideology, Orthodoxy has replaced communism as the lodestar of Russian society.¹⁰⁶

As in the 19th century, today's pan-Slav movement is based not only on ethnic grounds but also on religious ones. Culture is again at the forefront in the Balkans, and religion is the biggest discriminating factor. The question remains: Will Russia again see itself as the protector of the Orthodox Christians in the Balkans and seek a predominant role in some sort of federation? The potential and means are present. No other "Great Power," such as Great Britain, which constantly kept an expansionist Russia from enlarging its sphere of influence in the Balkans during the 19th century, is present to prevent a resurgent nationalist Russia from achieving an Orthodox alliance. However, there is a conceivable conflict of interest in the region, which may draw deeper lines in an east-west, Orthodox-Protestant/Catholic confrontation.

Germany has aligned itself with Croatia. Germany was the first country to recognize Croatia as an independent state with the right to secede from Yugoslavia, and did so unilaterally in 1991, though the U.S., other EC governments,

¹⁰⁶James H. Billington, "The Case for Orthodoxy," New Republic, May 30, 1994, pp. 24-25.

and the U.N. Security Council objected.¹⁰⁷ The Germans have long historical ties with the Croats and Slovenes through the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and today "nearly two-thirds of the 600,000 Yugoslav 'Guest Workers' in present-day Germany are of Croatian origin."¹⁰⁸ The Germans and the Croats were allied during World War II by the Tripartite pact of March 25, 1941. And on April 10, 1941, according to T.W. Carr,

The 14th Panzer division rolled into Zagreb enthusiastically welcomed by Croats. Within hours, working to a well-prepared plan, Dr. Edmund Vesenmager (Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop's envoy from Berlin) proclaimed on Zagreb radio the formation of the Independent State of Croatia (ISC) under Poglavnik (leader) Ante Pavelic.¹⁰⁹

The outcome of the new ISC under Pavelic and the appointment of Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac as Senior Military Chaplain by Pope Pius XII, was the sanctioning of the Ustashi. The Ustashi, according to T.W. Carr, was used to kill a million "Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies, and to forcefully convert another 250,000 to Catholicism."¹¹⁰ This interpretation of history is the basis of what many Serbs

¹⁰⁷"Countdown to Recognition," Economist, December 21, 1991, p. 57.

¹⁰⁸"U.N. Yields to Germany on Yugoslavia, Following Lead of France and Britain," New York Times, December 16, 1991, p. A12.

¹⁰⁹T.W. Carr, "For Serbians, Fears of a German Axis Rise For The Third Time This Century," Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, December 31, 1992, p. 16.

¹¹⁰Ibid.

have been led to believe is another attempt by a supposed German, Croat, and Vatican "Axis" to repeat what occurred during World War II.

Is Germany seeking European dominance along historical and cultural lines? With unification, Germany has become a force to be reckoned with, not only in Europe, but in the world arena as well. Misha Glenny argues that:

There appears little doubt any more that Germany wishes to establish itself as *primus inter pares* in Europe. However, in contrast to past attempts by Germany to assert its supremacy in Europe, it has neither the means nor the intention of doing so by force of arms. In addition, it has no need. Its chosen instrument is economic expansion.¹¹¹

Robert Mark Spaulding's research confirms a continuity in German history of applying trade leverage to pursue political purposes in Eastern Europe. Spaulding writes that the preconditions for applying German trade leverage are present in most forms. For instance, Spaulding says:

Trade-based diplomacy in the East has depended on an anarchic or highly politicized international trade regime that would allow Germany to bring its full economic advantage to bear on the less developed Eastern countries by approaching them on a bilateral basis and employing a full range of sanctions or inducements.¹¹²

¹¹¹Misha Glenny, "Germany fans the flames of war," New Statesman & Society, December 20, 1991, p. 14.

¹¹²Robert Mark Spaulding, Jr., "German trade policy in Eastern Europe, 1890-1990: preconditions for applying international trade leverage," International Organization, Summer 1991, p 366.

D. EU SOLIDARITY OR REALPOLITIK?

The Greeks and the Germans, although partners in the European Union, have clashed concerning the Macedonian question and interests in the Balkans. However, it is not only the German-Croat and Greek-Serbian relationships that are causing problems, but also the German-Turkish/Muslim connection that is spilling over into the Macedonian question. Positive German-Turkish relations have been deliberately fostered since the nineteenth century, with political, economic, and military dimensions. This background, together with the animosity between Greece and Turkey throughout the centuries, complicates German-Greek relations. Turkey is a member of NATO, but also desires European Union membership. So far, Turkey has been excluded from membership, but, as Ian O. Lesser explains, "Germany is widely viewed as the one country that could successfully promote Turkey's application for membership in the EC."¹¹³

Greece views Turkey as seeking regional power status in the Balkans. Turkey's aim in the Balkans, at least in some Greek analyses, is to legitimize its role in Europe, and thus to be seen as a Western-facing nation rather than an Oriental/Mideast one. Commenting on this view, Miltiadhes

¹¹³Fuller and Lesser, Turkey's New Geopolitics, p. 110.

Evert says that:

The first axis of Ankara's foreign policy aims at assuring the world that Turkey is becoming or appears to be a factor of influence over Balkan developments and is the protector of all Muslims in the region. This policy is a direct outgrowth of Turkey's desire to play a European role and to be a serious actor in the evolving European scene. In short, a role in the Balkans assures and legitimizes Turkey's Western orientation and its European agenda.¹¹⁴

Examples supporting this interpretation of Turkish aims in the Balkans include Turkey's immediate recognition of FYROM in 1991, the February 1994 trip of the Prime Ministers of Turkey and Pakistan to Sarajevo and Skopje, and their offer of 300,000 Muslim troops to augment the U.N. peace keeping mission. The Turks have expressed concern regarding the wellbeing of the estimated 20-40% Muslim Albanian population in FYROM.

Not only do Greece and Germany have conflicting political and cultural alliances, but they also have competitive economic interests. With the Cold War over, the Greeks want to resume business in the Balkans as a whole, including countries formerly under Communist control. Greece has developed some extensive designs for the region, designs that would create a Greek zone of economic influence in the Balkans comparable to that of Germany in western and

¹¹⁴Miltiades Evert, "Turkey's Strategic Goals: Possibilities and Weaknesses," Mediterranean Quarterly, Fall 1993, p. 31.

central Europe.

The Greek designs include a currency zone based on the Greek Drachma, with a banking and financial center in Athens, and an industrial and export center in Thessoloniki.¹¹⁵ This is the new "Great Idea" of Greece in the Balkans. Whether it is feasible remains to be seen.

However, Germany's economic weight threatens the role Greece desires to play in the Balkans economically and politically. Not only is Germany the leading trading partner and foreign investor in Turkey,¹¹⁶ but its trade with the countries of southeastern Europe in 1993 has grown, according to information from the Federal Economics Ministry, "with above average dynamism," and with a forecast of "real economic growth."¹¹⁷ Greeks are concerned because "Germany is now FYROM's largest trading partner, with a 40-percent share of its foreign trade."¹¹⁸

Finally, the economic competition between Germany and Greece for new markets in the Balkans, leads us now to the

¹¹⁵"A new Great Idea," Economist, May 22, 1993, p. 13.

¹¹⁶Fuller and Lesser, Turkey's New Geopolitics, pp. 109-110.

¹¹⁷"Eastern Trade Rises Steeply," Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 29 July 1994 (FBIS-WEU-94-150, 29 July 1994), p. 23.

¹¹⁸"Kinkel, Skopje's Gligorov on Conflict With Greece," Berlin DDP/ADN, 12 August 1994 (FBIS-WEU-94-156, 12 August 1994).

economic strain that Greece places on the European Union, directly, and on Germany, indirectly. For the Greeks cannot dream of fulfilling any of their "Great Ideas," unless the European Union subsidizes their economy as in the past. Describing Greece's poor economic situation, Folkert Jensma says that:

Last year the country had a 18-percent rate of inflation and a government deficit of 96 percent of gross GNP. Salaries tend to rise by an average 20 percent a year. A good 15 percent of the working population has guaranteed lifelong employment with the government in organizations with little purpose. The billions of ECUs which Brussels pumps into the Greek economy appear to evaporate immediately.¹¹⁹

With this poor economic situation, described above, and with the requirements for participation in the Maastricht Treaty monetary union elusive--indeed, remote--at this point for Greece, other European Union members, including Germany, are losing their patience with an "intemperate" and "irrational" Greek policy on the Macedonian question.. This poor economic situation, along with Greece's political disputes with its neighbors, appears to be driving Greece further from convergence with the EU.

Consequently, after an initial display of agreement in the EU, with the Lisbon declaration, the EU nations of

¹¹⁹Folkert Jensma, "Brussels Fears Greeks as President," Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD, 24 December 1993 (FBIS-WEU-93-247, 28 December 1993), p. 5.

France, Germany, Britain, and Italy established diplomatic ties with FYROM on December 16, 1993. In response to this EU decision and U.N. recognition, Greece closed its northern border and imposed a trade embargo with FYROM in February 1994. Because of the Greek economic blockade on FYROM, the EU has brought Greece before the European Court of Justice. This Court made its ruling on June 29, 1994, throwing "out a European Union appeal for Greece to lift a unilateral blockage against the neighboring FYROM."¹²⁰

This is where the situation currently stands. Both Greece and FYROM are building bridges with others in the region and in the world, but not between each other. The Greek embargo has pushed FYROM into the arms of the Albanians, the Bulgarians, the Germans, and the Turks, all among Greece's historic enemies. Hugh Pope writes that "a protocol has been signed in Bulgaria to revive a project that...will link Macedonia (FYROM), Albania, Turkey, and Bulgaria with a new highway, railway, fiber-optic communications network, and natural-gas pipeline."¹²¹ In addition, the rift between Greece and its EU partners has also encouraged FYROM's intransigence regarding the

¹²⁰"European Court Rejects EU Appeal on FYROM Embargo," Paris AFP, 29 June 1994 (FBIS-WEU-94-126, 29 Jun 1994).

¹²¹Hugh Pope, "New flash points in the powder keg," World Press Review, May 1994, v41, n5, p. 17.

mediation effort by Cyrus Vance.

Thus, a peaceful settlement is currently in the opposite direction of where Greece and FYROM appear to be heading. The risk of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina spreading to encompass the southern Balkans is greater today than several years ago. The situation is also not improved at all by the formation of alliances and alignments consistent with historic patterns, and reflecting competitive Great Power geopolitical interests in the region.

These phenomena in diplomacy and alliance-building contribute to the instability that already exists in this part of the world. This situation in the Balkans also illustrates the emergence of a multipolar system in Europe, which is replacing the old bipolar, East-West, Cold War relationship. Clearly this is a critical period in European history, and it is imperative that it be mapped out slowly and methodically. It should be recalled that the spark that touched off World War I was struck in the Balkans, and the contemporary equivalent well might be developing today with the volatile Macedonian question.

IV. THE MACEDONIAN "SYNDROME"

The present conditions are potentially ripe for an expanded, high-intensity conflict between Balkan nationalist movements. Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) are locked in a spiral of heightened tensions and hostility. As mentioned above, this "spiraling effect" has been apparent in increasingly aggressive provocations, in efforts to uphold perceived rights that seem of trivial importance to outsiders, and in the lack of any unilateral initiatives for conflict-resolution. Such initiatives appear to be unlikely, because of a general fear that they might be interpreted as a sign of weakness.¹²² In addition, the types of nationalism displayed by states in the Balkan region are oriented toward incorporating their diaspora by means of territorial expansion and annexation.¹²³ Many now believe that the Macedonian region may be the next casualty of war in the continuing Balkan conflict.¹²⁴

¹²²The characteristic patterns of the spiral model are described in chapter 3 of Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 62-113.

¹²³Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism," pp.5-39.

¹²⁴For a detailed analysis regarding a protracted conflict in the southern Balkans, see Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Is the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia a Security Threat to Greece?" Mediterranean Quarterly (Winter 1994), pp. 84-105; and Duncan M. Perry, "Macedonia: A Balkan Problem and a European Dilemma," RFE/RL Research Report,

To illustrate the danger of this conflict igniting into war, this chapter compares the current Macedonian question with the historical model of international relations and political development proposed by Myron Weiner.¹²⁵ Weiner's model suggests that there are characteristic patterns of domestic and international development involving an irredentist state, a status-quo state (anti-irredentist), and a shared ethnic group that is present in both the irredentist and status-quo states. In his model, Weiner proposes that these characteristics form a "syndrome," which can be used to identify and explain the crisis, predict its likely path, and provide recommendations for a solution to the problem.¹²⁶

This inquiry uses Weiner's model to identify and explain the hyper-nationalist quandary in the southern Balkans, to outline the possible future of these movements, and to suggest recommendations to solve this "spiraling" dilemma. Weiner's model assumes a minimum of three actors--an irredentist state, a status-quo state, and a shared ethnic group. The model also emphasizes three conditions. First, the shared ethnic group must feel that it is a

Vol. 1, no. 25, 19 June 1992, pp. 35-45.

¹²⁵Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," pp. 665-683.

¹²⁶Ibid., pp. 667, 670.

distinct nation. Walker Connor defines a nation as "a group of people who believe they are ancestrally related."¹²⁷ In other words, this national group must also be aware of its own distinct identity in terms of its history, language, culture, religion, etc., with relation to the other national groups present in the state.

Second, an irredentist claim (or a perceived claim) is made by the revisionist power to incorporate the national group. In characterizing three types of nationalisms, Stephen Van Evera would label the above irredentist claim as "diaspora-annexing" nationalism.¹²⁸ According to Van Evera,

Some nationalisms (the diaspora-accepting variety) are content with partial union...Some nationalisms (the immigrationist type) seek to incorporate their diasporas in the national state, but are content to pursue union by seeking immigration of the diaspora...Finally, some nationalisms seek to incorporate their diasporas by means of territorial expansion...Such diaspora-annexing nationalisms are the most dangerous of the three, since their goals and tactics produce the greatest territorial conflict with others.¹²⁹

The third, and last, type highlights the political significance of the irredentist claim by both the

¹²⁷Walker Connor, "From Tribe to Nation," History of European Ideas, vol. 13, no. 1/2 (1991), p. 6 (emphasis in the original), cited in Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 1.

¹²⁸Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism," p. 12.

¹²⁹Ibid.

irredentist and anti-irredentist state. Although the anti-irredentist state may not find the irredentist claim to be enforceable in terms of absolute power calculations (armed forces, economic indicators, etc.), or justifiable in terms of the territorial expanse claimed, it may find the claim to be credible if:

A state's previous unfortunate experience with a type of danger [has sensitized] it to other examples of that danger. While this sensitivity may lead the state to avoid the mistake it committed in the past, it may also lead it mistakenly to believe that the present situation is like the past one.¹³⁰

Actors and conditions of the types identified by Van Evera, Jervis and Weiner are present in the irredentist dispute between Greece and FYROM. Within this analysis, FYROM is considered the irredentist state, Greece is the status-quo state, and the Slav Macedonians constitute the shared ethnic group. The Slav Macedonians constitute a majority ethnic group in FYROM and a minority in Greece.

As stated above, Weiner's model isolates characteristic patterns of political development that form "a syndrome-- that is, they are generally found together, are causally interrelated, and owe their origin to common factors."¹³¹ The following is an analysis of the Macedonian question in light of the model presented by Weiner.

¹³⁰Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," p. 480.

¹³¹Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," p. 670.

A. REVISIONIST ALLIANCE-BUILDING

In describing this first characteristic regarding the irredentist state, Weiner says:

The irredentist state pressing for a revision of the international boundary will generally attempt to form alliances to threaten the state containing the ethnic minority. "Natural" allies are neighboring states of the "enemy" and other states that also seek to rectify international boundaries, or are anti-status quo with respect to the international or regional balance of power.¹³²

FYROM has apparently chosen Turkey as its "natural" ally. FYROM's apparent choice of ally is an interesting one, because it constitutes more of an "unnatural" rather than a "natural" relationship. It would appear that FYROM's choice of ally (Turkey) runs counter to its history (Ottoman rule over this region), language (Macedonian), religion (Orthodox), and ethnicity (Slavic). An alliance with Serbia or Bulgaria would have better met the "natural ally" criteria (assuming that these criteria include a shared history, ethnicity, language, religion, etc.).

Perhaps the most obvious explanation for FYROM's choice of ally resides in Serbia's, Bulgaria's, and even Albania's irredentist claims on FYROM's territory. From that standpoint, it would be "natural" for FYROM to ally itself with Turkey. Nonetheless, FYROM's alliance with Turkey has

¹³²Ibid.

apparently been realized for two diverse reasons.

First, FYROM feels threatened by its neighbors, and is seeking security guarantees for its territorial integrity. From this standpoint, FYROM may be allying with Turkey for fear of threats to its territorial integrity. Since FYROM is extremely weak in terms of its military and economy, it would stand to reason that it would seek out allies.

This perspective, seen from a purely aggregate power point of view, is consistent with hypotheses on why states form alliances in a "balancing" relationship.¹³³ However, this relationship leaves FYROM vulnerable from another standpoint. FYROM is acting from a position of weakness with regard to Turkey. As Stephen M. Walt has pointed out, "allying with the strong side...gives the new member little influence and leaves it vulnerable to the whims of its partners."¹³⁴ What makes FYROM vulnerable, from this

¹³³Stephen M. Walt provides hypotheses on balancing in "Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning," in International Politics, ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), pp. 70-77. The following propositions summarize Walt's hypotheses on why states balance: 1) States facing an external threat will align with others to oppose the states posing the threat; 2) The greater the threatening state's aggregate power, the greater the tendency for others to align against it; 3) The nearer a powerful state, the greater the tendency for those nearby to align against it; 4) The greater a state's offensive capabilities, the greater the tendency for others to align against it; 5) The more aggressive a state's perceived intentions, the more likely others are to align against that state.

¹³⁴Ibid., p. 71.

standpoint of a weaker partner, is the possibility of Turkey coercing FYROM to pursue a revision of the international boundary with Greece when it may not want this revision.

According to the second interpretation, which is supported in this model, FYROM actually has an irredentist claim on Greek territory and is posturing and allying itself with a regional power to achieve that goal. This is the Greek perception (or misperception) of what is occurring concerning FYROM's use of the name "Macedonia" and of symbols which Greece regards as a usurpation of its past.¹³⁵ Not only does Greece perceive this convergence of interests between FYROM and Turkey, but it actually expects this challenge. According to Nikolaos Zahariadis, "FYROM is expected to welcome Turkey's role as a regional benefactor and protector, given Skopje's internal political and economic weakness and historical rivalries with other regional powers."¹³⁶

Whether it has been perceived or expected, indications of a "special" relationship between FYROM and Turkey have been manifest in recent high-level visits by Turkish officials to FYROM. For instance, in his August 1994 trip to FYROM and Albania, Husamettin Cindoruk, the speaker of

¹³⁵Zahariadis, "Nationalism and Small-State," pp. 663-664.

¹³⁶Ibid., p. 664.

the Turkish Grand National Assembly, said that Turkey's national policy towards FYROM was based on "respect for its territorial integrity and the inalienability of its borders, as well as on Macedonia's [FYROM's] natural right to choose its own name and flag, which has a historical background."¹³⁷

Since Greece has been sensitized by a strategic culture that is based on Hobbesian (or anarchic) assumptions, its analysis of the Turkey-FYROM relationship may exaggerate its significance. That is, Greece's processing of ambiguous information regarding the Turkey-FYROM relationship may be distorted by its beliefs about Turkey's intentions in the Balkans and FYROM's intentions in Greece.¹³⁸

This phenomenon is a common problem for governments, which may tend to "place a square peg in a round hole" concerning incoming facts and information. Therefore, governments may make errors in judgement because, as Jervis says, "the evidence available to decision-makers is almost always very ambiguous since accurate clues to others' intentions are surrounded by noise and deception."¹³⁹

¹³⁷"Turkish National Assembly Speaker on Joint Ties," Belgrade TANJUG, 7 Aug 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-153, 7 Aug 94).

¹³⁸Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," p. 472.

¹³⁹Ibid., p. 474.

B. ANTI-IRREDENTIST ALLIANCE BUILDING

Greece's perception of a coordinated "attack against Orthodoxy and Hellenism" by Turkey through FYROM and Albania¹⁴⁰, and the subsequent negative shift in the once stable (bipolar) Balkan balance of power, have resulted in what Weiner identifies as the second characteristic of the "Macedonian syndrome" in political development and international relations. In describing this second characteristic, Weiner writes:

The anti-irredentist state with the ethnic minority will respond by attempting to form defensive alliances to preserve existing borders. "Natural" allies are neighbors of its irredentist neighbor and other powers that for one reason or another wish to preserve the status quo.¹⁴¹

Greece, the anti-irredentist state in this model, has responded with an apparent alliance with Serbia. As mentioned above, Greece feels threatened by what it perceives as FYROM's plans to annex the northern Greek province of Macedonia. The expected response, from a traditional balance of power theory, would be to form alliances that would "balance" against the perceived

¹⁴⁰"A Finger in the Hole in the Dam Wall," Skopje PULS, 3 Jun 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-110, 3 Jun 94), p. 6.

¹⁴¹Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," pp. 671-672.

threat.¹⁴² With Greece's historic protector (the U.S.) seen as disengaging from Europe, Greece has turned to a regional power, Serbia, as a partner in resisting perceived Macedonian claims. This opinion regarding the reliability and commitment of the United States to Greece and Europe is widely held in Greece. For instance, Stathis Evstathiadhis says:

Many U.S. politicians have repeatedly requested the President to delink the United States from Europe...it is important to know whether Greece is aware that Washington is 'abandoning us, if it has not done so already.' Athens must look in its immediate area to find the 'friendly powers' whose intervention every Greek Government hopes will solve the national issues that periodically emerge.¹⁴³

Unlike FYROM's alliance with Turkey, Greece's alliance with Serbia conforms more to a "natural" alliance definition. Greece and Serbia have a common cultural background, share the same historic enemies, and have a tradition of alliances with one another in the Balkans. Contrary to Weiner's explanation of this "natural" ally's intentions, however, Serbia is widely believed to want to change the Balkan balance-of-power in its favor if given the opportunity. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic has been reported to have proposed the partition of FYROM between

¹⁴²For a detailed summary of hypotheses on balancing, see Stephen M. Walt, footnote 12.

¹⁴³"Greece-U.S.-Europe Triangle Discussed," Athens TO VIMA TIS KIRIAKIS, 17 Jul 94 (FBIS-WEU-94-145, 28 Jul 94).

Greece and Serbia. The Greek Prime Minister at the time, Konstantinos Mitsotakis, declined the offer and reported the Serbian proposition to the European Union.¹⁴⁴

Kiro Gligorov, the President of FYROM, confirmed this apparent alliance between Greece and Serbia during a June 1994 interview discussing regional relations. When asked if the coordination between Greece and Serbia violated the Bucharest agreement of 1913, Gligorov said that "it is well known that the Serbs are supported by the Greek government and politics."¹⁴⁵ Later, when asked if the plan of some Greek political actors for a common Greek-Serb border would have been realized if it were not for the "Turkish danger," Gligorov said that it "would suit the Serbs."¹⁴⁶

C. GREAT POWER POLITICS AND SUPPORT

Great power politics regarding support for newly independent Balkan states following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire set precedents comparable to the dilemmas facing newly independent Balkan states after the collapse of Yugoslavia. Which great powers are eager to expand their

¹⁴⁴Duncan Perry, "Macedonia: A Balkan Problem and a European Dilemma," RFE/RL Research Report, 19 June 1992, p. 44.

¹⁴⁵"Gligorov Discusses Regional Relations," Zagreb VECERNJI LIST, 29 Jun 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-129, 29 Jun 94), pp. 6-7.

¹⁴⁶Ibid.

spheres of influence in the Balkans through support to regional states? This is what Weiner proposes in his third characteristic:

Neighboring states and larger, more powerful countries are often drawn into irredentist disputes, sometimes to endorse the claims of one side or the other, sometimes formally to join one of the alliances, sometimes simply to establish more trade with, provide more assistance to, or become friendlier with one state rather than the other.¹⁴⁷

Two separate developments occurred that involved great power politics and support, which appeared to many Greeks to support FYROM and to "upset the regional balance of power by strengthening FYROM's hand."¹⁴⁸ The first involved the decision by the United States to deploy peacekeeping troops in FYROM. In Greek eyes, this decision gave the appearance of legitimacy to a state not diplomatically recognized by the United States and the European Union. Consequently, the deployment of U.S. soldiers on FYROM's soil created the impression that the United States, through the United Nations, had taken sides in the dispute between Greece and FYROM, even though the U.S. troops were deployed along the FYROM border with the Serb-dominated "rump Yugoslavia" and were evidently intended to deter Serbian aggression against FYROM.

¹⁴⁷Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," p. 672.

¹⁴⁸Zahariadis, "Nationalism and Small-State," p. 665.

The second development, which Zahariadis called "another tilt in regional power," came when six European Union countries and the United States officially recognized FYROM in December 1993 and early 1994. At least for the six European Union members, this recognition ran counter to their earlier decision, under the Lisbon declaration in 1992, not to recognize FYROM with any mention of the name "Macedonia." Again, this decision gave the appearance of support for FYROM despite Greek claims and the obligations of solidarity within the European Union.

These two developments have resulted in a Greek perception of bias that deviates from Greek interests.¹⁴⁹ Many Greeks have concluded that their assessments of Greece's foreign relations disputes are not shared by German, French, or British observers. Many Greeks have also concluded that most of their European Union partners will emphasize the need to protect and support small Balkan countries (FYROM and Albania) that depend substantially on Western aid.¹⁵⁰ Kostos Beis contends that "West Europeans have stopped discussing borders, devoted attention to economic development, and see no reason simply because they

¹⁴⁹"Greece Does Not Provoke," Athens I KATHEMERINI, 23 Sep 94, (FBIS-WEU-94-185, 23 Sep 1994), p. 1.

¹⁵⁰"Even Harder Days for Greece in Europe," Athens I KATHIMERINI, 17 Jul 1994 (FBIS-WEU-94-139, 17 Jul 1994), p. 11.

are Greece's friends, to 'adopt our enemies as their own.'¹⁵¹

To counter the Western European bias, Greece has turned to the United States for support and to the powerful Greek-American lobby in Washington. Describing a meeting with the President on March 9, 1994, Hanna Rosin says that:

Clinton, Vice President Al Gore and national security adviser Anthony Lake met with (lobbyist) Andrew Manatos, Senator Paul Sarbanes, Greek Orthodox Archbishop Iakovos and thirteen other prominent Greek-Americans; no one from the State Department was invited. Afterward, Clinton announced he would wait to put an embassy in Skopje until the dispute with Greece was resolved.¹⁵²

With this signal from the United States, Greece has attempted to use its U.S. "bargaining chip" as leverage in the European Union, and to defer to U.S. policy in the region. But some Greek observers argue that this Greek foreign policy decision was short-sighted. Regarding Greece's ties to U.S. policy in the Balkans, K.I. Angelopoulos says:

[Greece] opted for a Balkan policy based on the assumption that U.S. strategic goals in the area and U.S. desire for stability in the Southern Balkans were closer to Greek interests than Germany's ambitious and 'aggressive' policy...problems [still] remain unresolved and Greek foreign policy does not dovetail

¹⁵¹Editorial Report on Greek Foreign Policy (FBIS-WEU-94-185, 23 Sep 1994).

¹⁵²Hanna Rosin, "Greek Pique," New Republic, 13 June 1994, p. 11.

with either EU or U.S. positions. Germany and the United States both support Turkey, [and] maintain the same positions on the FYROM.¹⁵³

It appears that Greece is becoming more isolated on its Balkan foreign policy, with no great power backing its views and interests in the region. This, however, has not been a total surprise to Greek officials, since no great powers gave Greece full support during its bloody independence struggle in the 19th century. In any case, Greece's isolation will certainly reinforce the assumptions of decision-makers in the Greek government who possess a Hobbesian outlook on international relations.

D. IRREDENTIST CLAIMS AND THE SHARED ETHNIC MINORITY

The next characteristic involves the impact of irredentist claims on the shared ethnic minority. With regard to this characteristic, Weiner says:

As the irredentist power expresses its concern for the status of the ethnic minority in the neighboring state, hope grows within the ethnic minority that it will be incorporated into the revisionist state or that, with the support of the revisionist power, it may achieve separate statehood.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵³Editorial Report on Greek Foreign Policy (FBIS-WEU-94-185, 23 Sep 1994). For a similar analysis, see "U.S. Follows 'Policy of Varying Distance,'" Athens ELEVTEROPIRIA, 28 Sep 1994 (FBIS-WEU-94-189, 28 Sep 1994), p. 13.

¹⁵⁴Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," p. 673.

A spark in the Balkan powderkeg emanates from the perceived territorial claims of FYROM on Bulgarian and Greek Macedonian provinces. FYROM's new constitution disturbed the Greeks and brought back an old fear of irredentism. According to Duncan M. Perry,

The Greeks...were troubled by Article 49 of the Republic of Macedonia's new constitution. The relevant passage stated that 'the Republic cares for the status and rights of those persons belonging to the Macedonian people in neighboring countries as well as Macedonian expatriates, assists their cultural development, and promotes links with them.' This wording, coupled with the openly irredentist position of IMRO-DPMNE, worried officials in Athens.¹⁵⁵

FYROM has also chosen some provocative symbols and language that incense the Greeks. The sixteen-point Sun of Vergina was chosen as the symbol for the flag of FYROM. However, this symbol was found on what is considered the tomb of Phillip II (the father of Alexander the Great) in 1977 during the excavations of the royal tombs of ancient Macedonia. In addition, maps have been printed in FYROM that depict the unification of the Macedonian state at the expense of current Greek borders, and currency has been produced with the famous White Tower of Thessaloniki (a city in Greece) portrayed on its front.

These symbols and ideas expressed by FYROM are perceived by Greece not only as a usurpation of its

¹⁵⁵Perry, "Macedonia: A Balkan Problem," p. 40.

heritage, but also as a threat to its national security.

Describing the significance of symbols, names, and ideas in unifying nationalism, Nicholaos Zahariadis says,

Symbols, ideas, names, and the historical memories that make up the national package have a propensity toward exclusivity because they are the ideational mechanisms of demarcating communities. Adopting a particular symbol, such as a flag, choosing a certain name, such as the name of a country, are some ways of acquiring an identity. Disputes are likely to erupt when symbols, ideas, and even history itself becomes contestable--that is, when two or more entities lay claim to the same thing.¹⁵⁶

Although these perceived provocations and claims are threatening to Greece, they have not hindered Greece's effort to assimilate minority populations into its national political system. Two factors have helped Greece in this assimilating process. First, Greece has fought six wars in this century alone. During and after each war ethnic populations were exchanged to such an extent that, in some cases, the ethnic character of several regions was changed dramatically. Concerning the exodus of "Slav-Macedonians" after the Greek Civil War ended in 1949, Evangelos Kofos says,

As with the mass eviction of Greeks from Asia Minor in 1922-1923, a great national calamity had its beneficial side-effects. Along with the thousands of guerrillas, abducted children and adults, the 'Slav-Macedonians'...left the country in large numbers.

¹⁵⁶Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Nationalism and Small-State," p. 651.

Thus, Greece was delivered of an alien-conscious minority which had actively threatened her security and internal peace.¹⁵⁷

The second factor affecting Greece's assimilation process is time. After the Greek Civil War ended in 1949, the Greeks had approximately forty unhindered years to assimilate their ethnic populations into a Greek national political culture. Only since Yugoslavia's collapse, and the subsequent international attention drawn to the conflict between FYROM and Greece, has there been an increase in hostility toward Greek efforts to assimilate a Slav-Macedonian minority group.

The Greek Government does not recognize a separate ethnic "Macedonian" people, and consequently does not recognize that an ethnic "Macedonian" minority exists in Greece. The Greeks assert that Slav-speakers, or "Slavophones" possessing a Greek national consciousness, represent a small group in Greece. The U.S. State Department estimates that between 10,000 and 50,000 Greek citizens still speak a Slavic dialect, with a few identifying themselves as "Macedonians."¹⁵⁸ "Macedonian"

¹⁵⁷Kofos, Nationalism and Communism, p. 186.

¹⁵⁸"Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992, U.S. Department of State, February 1993, p. 795, as quoted in "The Macedonians of Greece," Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, April 1994, p. 13. Although this report sheds light on the possibility of minority rights violations in Greece, it takes a careless approach in filtering the possible biased

activists in Northern Greece estimate the ethnic "Macedonian" population of the Greek Macedonian province at approximately one million, while the Government of FYROM estimates the population at 230,000 to 270,000.¹⁵⁹ Despite the numbers cited, there appears to be evidence that some Greek citizens possess a "Macedonian" rather than a Greek national consciousness, and are hostile to national integration efforts by the Greek state. Whether this hostility is a result of FYROM's supposed or actual irredentist claims and the hoped-for incorporation of a "Macedonian" minority into FYROM is unknown at this point.

E. RESPONSES BY THE ETHNIC MINORITY TO IRREDENTIST CLAIMS

Weiner says there are three possible responses by the ethnic minority to irredentist claims:

First, the minority can accept the existing international boundaries, strive for improving its status within the country in which it is a minority, and press for improved relations between the two countries, viewing itself as a "bridge" of possible friendship. Second, the minority can be ardently committed to union with its kinsmen across the border by supporting the claim of the irredentist power. Or

and distorted facts and information quoted by organizations and sources. The report should at least have explained the inclination of such groups and organizations to use hyper-nationalist propaganda. In that way, quotes such as those referring to ethnic populations (pp. 5-6, footnotes 10, 12) could first be analyzed with the source in mind, and not just be considered fact.

¹⁵⁹"The Macedonians of Greece," Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, April 1994, p. 12.

third, if the ethnic group is a minority in both countries, it may favor union in a single state of its own.¹⁶⁰

It is unclear which response has been supported by those who consider themselves ethnic "Macedonians" in Greece. However, Weiner does suggest that if the ethnic group is a majority in one state and a minority in the other, then there will be a strong inclination for the minority group to unite with the state in which that ethnic group is in the majority.¹⁶¹ This assessment would suggest that the "Macedonians" of Greece would want to merge with the 65% of FYROM's population who also consider themselves "Macedonian."¹⁶² What is evident, in spite of the speculation regarding mergers and independent nationhood, is the intense debate regarding the ethnicity and identity of those in Greece who consider themselves to be ethnic "Macedonians."

In July 1993, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki conducted a fact-finding mission in Northern Greece and FYROM to interview those who consider themselves to be ethnically and

¹⁶⁰Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," pp. 673-674.

¹⁶¹Ibid., p. 674.

¹⁶²Zlatko Isakovic and Constantine P. Danopoulos, "In Search of Identity: Civil-Military relations and Nationhood in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)," in Civil-Military Relations in Soviet & Yugoslav Successor States, eds. Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 177.

culturally "Macedonian." According to one such individual, a member of the human rights group called the Macedonian Movement for Balkan Prosperity (MMBP):

I am a Macedonian. I am different from other Greek citizens. I have a different culture; I got it from my father and my grandfather. I speak a different language...until I was six years old I spoke only Macedonian. Especially in the villages, people talk in Macedonian. The heart of the matter is that we just want to be accepted and recognized as a different ethnic group.¹⁶³

On the other hand, others were interviewed who had a "Greek consciousness." One such individual was Theophilos Dafkos, an agronomist whose parents were born in FYROM. In a statement concerning this issue, Dafkos said,

I speak Macedonian, but I am a Greek. The people who claim to be Macedonian are really Slavs. There is no such thing as a Macedonian nation. Ninety-seven percent of the people in northern Greece are purely Greek. A few people who try to make trouble work through the government of Skopje to bring in money from Australia and Canada [from Macedonian emigres]. They spread propaganda to create unrest in the area and divide people. They try to take advantage of the people who speak two languages--they are about 40 percent of the population. But everyone is Greek.¹⁶⁴

F. STATUS QUO POWER'S RESPONSE TO IRREDENTIST CLAIMS

As the intense debate persists over the identity of an ethnic "Macedonian" group in Greece, a suspicious reaction by the Greek Government is predicted in Weiner's model.

¹⁶³"The Macedonians of Greece," Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, April 1994, p. 14.

¹⁶⁴Ibid., pp. 17-18.

Weiner says, "as demands for revision of boundaries on the part of the irredentist power persist, the status quo power will become increasingly suspicious of the loyalty of its ethnic minority whose status is being disputed."¹⁶⁵

Specifically, Weiner predicts that the government would react by pursuing policies that would, simultaneously, move in two directions. The first direction would attempt to accelerate programs of nationalization--through school and religious programs, language requirements, and insistence on the use of symbols that imply identification with the national government. The second direction would impose more control over the disputed minority. These measures take the form of police surveillance and stricter border enforcement.¹⁶⁶

There is evidence that these measures toward minorities in general or toward a specific people who consider themselves "Macedonian" have either already taken place in the nationalization process, or are currently underway, in Greece. For instance, members of the Human Rights Watch/Helsinki mission asked Greek citizens who maintained an ethnic "Macedonian" consciousness whether a married couple could name a child by a Slavic name. One individual

¹⁶⁵Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," p. 674.

¹⁶⁶Ibid., p. 674.

said:

You couldn't possibly do that. When a baby is born you take the birth certificate without a name to the church and tell the priest what you want the baby's name to be. The church accepts only Greek names. So in order for the baby to be properly registered with the government, you have to give it a Greek name.¹⁶⁷

This policy may not necessarily mean that a child whose parents refused to accept a Greek name would be denied citizenship. What it might imply, however, is that the parents could be denied a religious ceremony if they insisted on a Slavic name. Whether this is a government/church program to nationalize Greek citizens in a Greek Orthodox state is not known. If this practice does exist, it may be comparable to efforts in other Balkan countries to assimilate minority ethnic populations through church membership and affiliation. In most Balkan states, if one is baptized in a national church, such as the Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian, or Macedonian Orthodox Churches, one becomes or is usually regarded in a government census as being a "Greek," a "Serb," a "Bulgarian," or a "Macedonian," whatever one's actual ethnic identity.

A program to enforce use of the national language is another tendency that Weiner predicts. It appears that there were some restrictions on the use of a "Macedonian" or

¹⁶⁷"The Macedonians of Greece," Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, April 1994, p. 15.

"local" language in the past.¹⁶⁸ This language or "idiom" spoken by many who consider themselves to be "Macedonian" is different from the Greek language, with most of its vocabulary consisting of Slavonic words. According to Nickolaos Zahariadis, "the idiom spoken by Macedonian Slavs--in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and several villages near the border in northern Greece--was known as a Western Bulgarian dialect that had noticeable but not significant Turkish and Greek influence."¹⁶⁹

The Greek government does not acknowledge that the language spoken by those who consider themselves "Macedonian" is a language at all. According to the Greek Foreign Ministry, "the idiom spoken in Greek Macedonia is identified by local peoples as 'dopia' (i.e., 'local')...it remains an oral idiom, with no written form, grammar or syntax...it should not be confused or identified with the 'Makedonski' of FYROM."¹⁷⁰

However, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki recorded "no prohibitions on the use of the ["Macedonian"] language in ordinary discourse," with some exceptions, but concluded that the Greek Government would not permit the "Macedonian"

¹⁶⁸Ibid., pp. 39-40.

¹⁶⁹Zahariadis, "Nationalism and Small-State," p. 655.

¹⁷⁰"The Macedonians of Greece," Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, April 1994, pp. 37-38.

language or idiom to be taught in private language schools.¹⁷¹ According to the report, the Greek government also would not register a cultural association called the "Center for Macedonian Culture."¹⁷² Although there were other complaints addressed in the report regarding the Greek government's prohibition of "Macedonian" cultural activities, the fact-finding mission did attend a folk festival in a northern Greek village where "Macedonian" ethnic dances, as well as dances of other groups, were performed without problems."¹⁷³

The second direction Weiner predicts involves placing more controls on the disputed minority. Again, the report published by Human Rights Watch/Helsinki reveals possible evidence of past discrimination and an apparent increase in controls. The controls discussed in the report take the form of police surveillance, border enforcement, harassment, and coercion.¹⁷⁴ The report says, "the Macedonian rights activists have been subjected to a good deal of harassment, including threats, strip searches, and confiscation of documents; they report that they are routinely followed, as

¹⁷¹Ibid., pp. 36-44.

¹⁷²Ibid., pp. 20-21.

¹⁷³Ibid., p. 16.

¹⁷⁴Ibid., pp.49-60.

was the July fact-finding mission."¹⁷⁵

In addition, the report described two incidents involving human rights activists and the release of their names for publication in a Greek newspaper by government officials. Both disclosures were published by the Greek newspaper "Stohos," which revealed on one occasion the names of those who had crossed the border into FYROM, and on a second occasion, the names, car license numbers, and passport numbers of those involved in interviews with the Human Rights Watch/Helsinki fact-finding mission.¹⁷⁶ The mission concluded that "the fact...police openly followed us may have exerted a chilling effect on some ethnic Macedonians. In the climate of fear in which Macedonians live in northern Greece, police surveillance discourages full cooperation with human rights monitoring groups."¹⁷⁷

**G. REVISIONIST POWER'S OBSESSION AND SENSITIVITY REGARDING
THE MINORITY ETHNIC GROUP**

Weiner also suggests the probable response of the revisionist power to the status quo power's tendency to "nationalize" its citizens and to institute tighter controls on the minority ethnic group. According to Weiner, "the

¹⁷⁵Ibid., p. 50.

¹⁷⁶Ibid., pp. 54-55 and Appendix H.

¹⁷⁷Ibid., p. 55.

revisionist power is easily aroused by steps taken by the neighboring state to assimilate, incorporate, integrate, or in any other significant (and sometimes insignificant) way to affect the status of the minority ethnic group."¹⁷⁸

Normally, this reaction to measures against the minority's ethnic identity would be "magnified" by the press, the political parties, and the government. However, FYROM cannot afford to do so. FYROM has a large Albanian minority (estimates vary from 20 to 40% of the population) that is increasingly demanding rights, and that is suspected of harboring secessionist aims. The government of FYROM must also contend with a Serbian minority that claims approximately one fourth of FYROM's two million population.

As a result, it appears that FYROM must temper its responses to what it perceives as mistreatment of the "Macedonian" minority in Greece and elsewhere so as not to display "Macedonian" nationalism, and thus threaten the Albanian and Serb minorities, possibly provoking them (and Tirana and Belgrade) to dismember FYROM. Although this is a sensitive issue that requires restraint from the government and media, reports criticizing foreign governments' behavior toward the "Macedonian" minority have been published in FYROM. Most concerns have been voiced by the VMRO-DPMNE

¹⁷⁸Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," p. 675.

(Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity), which held the majority in FYROM's first assembly in 1991-1994.

For instance, in an interview the Vice President of the VMRO-DPMNE, Dosta Dimovska, said that the basis of friendly relations with Greece was dependent on its respect for the "Macedonian nation" living within its borders. Dimovska also said that compromise on FYROM's name, flag, and an article in its constitution (which refers to a "Macedonian nation" in Greece) would not be feasible. But Dimovska's most provocative accusations referred directly to perceived injustices against the "Macedonian nation" in Greece. Concerning these accusations, Dimovska says, "...we shall do our best to correct the injustices that have been done against these people ["Macedonians" in Greece]. Genocide should be stopped and their ["Macedonians"] names should not have to be changed."¹⁷⁹

Along with its sensitivity regarding a perceived discrimination against--and "genocide" of--the "Macedonian nation" in Greece, the VMRO-DPMNE has also expressed expansive and provocative claims. Deputies of the VMRO-DPMNE have claimed that the "Macedonian" people constitute

¹⁷⁹"We are not a Terrorist Party," Skopje VECER, 23 Sep 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-192, 4 Oct 94), p. 4.

the second largest Balkan population, with 2 million in Bulgaria and 1.5 million in Greece. Assembly Deputy Speaker Tito Petkovski said that "Greece has received Aegean Macedonia as a gift from [the] great powers in 1913 and that it [Greece] has no legitimate rights over that territory."¹⁸⁰

Other foreign acts of discrimination and rights abuses against "Macedonians" have been highlighted and magnified in FYROM's media. In March 1994, FYROM's Foreign Ministry reacted harshly when the Australian Government decided to recognize the "Macedonian community" living in Australia as "Slav-Macedonians," and when buildings belonging to the Macedonian Orthodox Church and the Macedonian community were targeted by "violent terrorist acts."¹⁸¹ Human rights organizations, such as "The Dignity Society" and "The Macedonian Movement for Balkan Prosperity," have also emphasized rights abuses by the Greek Government against "Macedonians" in Aegean Macedonia (Northern Greece). The President of "The Dignity Society," Kole Mangov, said that his organization had documented 400 cases of "Greek authorities' discrimination against Macedonians," involving nonrecognition of a "Macedonian" identity, denying entry

¹⁸⁰"Party Claims Macedonians Second Largest Balkan Nation," Belgrade TANJUG, 7 Apr 93 (FBIS-EEU-93-066, 8 Apr 93).

¹⁸¹"Basic Human Rights Violated," Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA, 14 Mar 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-049, 14 Mar 94), p. 1.

into Greece of Greek citizens who claim they are "Macedonians," revoking citizenship, and confiscating property.¹⁸²

H. PRIORITIES OF THE REVISIONIST POWER

The revisionist power is likely to show increased sensitivity concerning the minority ethnic group and questions related to boundary rectification. Weiner says that this issue, "rather than matters of internal development, receives the highest priority....In foreign policy, the government searches for allies and arms; in domestic policy, it gives high priority to military expenditures."¹⁸³

This is a difficult factor to analyze and judge, since FYROM is in an early phase of state-building and institutional development. In addition, FYROM must divert much of its political activity and security measures to perceived separatist movements by Albanian and Serb minorities within FYROM, and to perceived irredentist claims from Albania, Serbia, and Bulgaria. Nonetheless, some evidence supports Weiner's hypothesis about the priorities of a revisionist power. This evidence may have a direct

¹⁸²"Individualization Against Discrimination," Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA, 6 Aug 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-177, 6 Aug 94), p. 13.

¹⁸³Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," p. 675.

relationship with FYROM's alleged irredentist obsession with Greece.

One such indication is provided by FYROM's priorities and procedures concerning defense allocations. Although FYROM's parliament is formally responsible by its constitution for shaping the defense budget, it is unable to do so in practice because of its infrequent assembly. This confers an enormous amount of control on the President and his cabinet concerning the approval of "cost overruns" and "supplementary allocations."¹⁸⁴

Consequently, the defense budget has "more than doubled in the last few years, and attempts to curb presidential authority in defense and foreign policy have notably failed."¹⁸⁵ Although prudence is understandable in light of the external threats perceived by FYROM's leadership, the centralization of Skopje's government may encourage the impression that this leadership is increasingly less accountable to the public. Greek elites may interpret developments in FYROM in ways that support existing convictions about FYROM's allegedly revisionist intentions.

This example of increased military expenditures and the inability of FYROM's parliament to safeguard against

¹⁸⁴Isakovic and Danopoulos, "Civil-Military Relations," p. 181.

¹⁸⁵Ibid.

executive domination might be seen as supporting Weiner's proposition about a revisionist power's domestic priorities. Another interpretation might be based on the judgement that Skopje's leaders may believe that their state's survival is highly threatened, and that their motives may therefore be defensive rather than revisionist. On the other hand, evidence of Skopje's budgetary priorities could be interpreted by some (notably, the Greeks) as a decision by FYROM's leaders to "put aside development programs in pursuit of their irredentist objectives."¹⁸⁶ Weiner cites Alexander Gerschenkron's analysis of Bulgarian pre-World War I economic development policies as an example of this characteristic.¹⁸⁷ Gerschenkron concluded that Bulgaria forfeited industrial development because of its preoccupation with expansion and its war preparations against Turkey.¹⁸⁸

While FYROM's defense budget is increasing and continues to do so without parliamentary accountability, reports suggest that the economy is plummeting. From 1993 to 1994, retail prices have risen by 121.8% and the cost of

¹⁸⁶Weiner, "Macedonian Syndrome," p. 675.

¹⁸⁷Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass. 1962), p. 233.

¹⁸⁸Ibid.

living by 128.3%, while salaries have decreased by 9.7%.¹⁸⁹ In addition, there was a 5.6% decrease in employment,¹⁹⁰ and a 1,200% increase in the trade deficit.¹⁹¹ In 1992 to 1993 economic growth was down 37%, inflation was running at 349.8%, and the national debt was \$665 million.¹⁹²

These economic developments do not necessarily prove that FYROM is pursuing a domestic policy along the lines that Weiner posited as characteristic of the revisionist state. However, the impressions that Greece may form from FYROM's increased military expenditures, with relation to its poor economy, may be decisive. Greece and FYROM appear to have become locked in a tighter "spiraling" relationship. The danger in this type of relationship is that it "stresses the prevalence of self-fulfilling prophecies."¹⁹³ That is, what was initially a false interpretation of the situation actually becomes a true one.

¹⁸⁹"Costs are Rising--Salaries are Falling," Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA, 6 Jan 95 (FBIS-EEU-95-009, 13 Jan 95), p. 1.

¹⁹⁰"Workers are Fired--Administrators are Employed," Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA, 5 Jan 95 (FBIS-EEU-95-007, 11 Jan 95), pp. 1-2.

¹⁹¹"Foreign Trade Deficit Increases 1,200 Percent," Skopje MIC, 28 Nov 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-229, 29 Nov 94).

¹⁹²The Military Balance 1994-1995 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994), p. 95.

¹⁹³Jervis, Perception and Misperception, p. 76.

FYROM's foreign policy has also given the Greeks cause for concern. FYROM's relationship with Turkey has already been mentioned. Other potential allies have been solicited by FYROM as well. Members of the European Union have not only recognized FYROM but have also helped raise much needed economic and humanitarian assistance, which ultimately undermined Greece's position.¹⁹⁴ FYROM is seeking associate membership in the European Union, and participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace.¹⁹⁵ Finally, U.S. deployment of peacekeeping forces under United Nations auspices is interpreted by FYROM as UN and U.S. support for the independence of an independent "Macedonia." FYROM's membership in prominent European and transatlantic organizations would undermine whatever leverage Greece has as the only Balkan country that is a member of both NATO and the European Union. The significance of Greek influence within these organizations in Balkan matters would be diminished, and this is seen in Athens as a threat to Greece.

The Greek response to FYROM's "search for allies" is evident in a poll conducted in June 1992, which asked

¹⁹⁴"Recognition of Macedonia Triggers Dispute with Greece," Paris AFP, 16 Dec 93 (FBIS-WEU-93-241, 17 Dec 93).

¹⁹⁵"Against Orthodox Bloc," Vienna PROFIL, 21 Mar 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-055, 21 Mar 94), p. 72.

respondents to rank foreign policy concerns. 60.2 percent of those polled placed FYROM at the top, with Turkey and Cyprus coming in second with 28.7%. When asked to identify the main security threat facing Greece, 68.3% placed Turkey at the top. FYROM followed with 35.5%, and Albania was last with 4.1%.¹⁹⁶

Thus, the Greek reaction (as the status-quo power) to FYROM's revisionist foreign policy appears to display the same type of "obsession" that Weiner suggests for the revisionist state. A closer look at Greece reveals a long history of "obsession" with Turkey. And with that "obsession" Greece has pursued the same foreign policy (allies and arms) and domestic policy (military expenditures above internal development) that Weiner describes as evident for the revisionist state. Its approach to the Macedonian question is not a new foreign and domestic policy by Greece, but an old policy patterned on (and influenced by) its troubled relationship with Turkey. It appears, then, that a policy of "obsession" is not reserved for only the revisionist power but may effect the status quo power as well.

¹⁹⁶"Foreign Policy Seen Lacking Long-Term Strategy," Athens I KATHIMERINI, 21 Aug 94 (FBIS-WEU-94-169, 31 Aug 94).

I. THE INTERNAL POWER STRUCTURE OF THE REVISIONIST POWER

As the irredentist objectives become paramount in the revisionist state, Weiner says, "the internal power structure ...is likely to develop in such a way as to favor those advocating order and unity at home and militancy abroad."¹⁹⁷ Dictatorial tendencies are likely to occur during this stage. According to Weiner, there is a strong inclination by the central government to "resist genuinely free elections and a representative process that might change the existing power structure."¹⁹⁸

One example has already been discussed: the centralized control that FYROM's President has over the defense budget. Another closely related example proves how powerful the President's position has become. In 1993, President Gligorov fired General Mitre Arsovski, FYROM's first chief of staff, and replaced him with a naval officer, Admiral Bocinov.

It appears that Arsovski's position as chief of staff gave him great control over military matters. This may have threatened Gligorov's capacity to influence developments in his country. Before replacing Arsovski, though, President Gligorov took steps to reduce the military's influence by

¹⁹⁷Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," p. 676.

¹⁹⁸Ibid.

increasing the police forces and giving them duties once under the military's jurisdiction. Observers in FYROM maintain that President Gligorov took these steps to strengthen his dominance and "personalize" FYROM's security forces.¹⁹⁹ This possible consolidation of the internal power structure may be illustrated by the background of the person Gligorov appointed to replace Arsovski as the chief of staff--a former Yugoslav naval officer, when FYROM--as a land-locked country--has no navy.

The President also chooses the prime minister and the minister of defense, which both are currently members of Gligorov's political party.²⁰⁰ According to Isakovic and Danopoulos, other steps have been taken to strengthen President Gligorov's position:

The general staff has been enlarged and is packed with officers personally loyal to the President. Despite opposition from many quarters, Gligorov managed to pass a law transferring all property (apartments, bases and entertainment facilities) occupied by the JNA to the FYROM military.²⁰¹

The director of the Interior Ministry is also appointed by the President of the Republic and a member of his staff. Although the economy is plummeting and the national debt is

¹⁹⁹Isakovic and Danopoulos, "Civil-Military Relations," pp. 181-182.

²⁰⁰Ibid.

²⁰¹Ibid. p. 183.

increasing, the Interior Ministry, which handles state security and aspects of counter-intelligence, is expanding.²⁰²

Evidence that the centralized government of President Gligorov is advocating internal "order and unity," while simultaneously resisting change to the established political composition, is mounting. In 1991, the two main ethnic Albanian political parties, the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) and the People's Democratic Party (NPD), boycotted a national census on the grounds of fraud. The NPD claims that around 40% of the population is Albanian. Government figures are about half of what the Albanians claim. The Serbian minority also expressed its disapproval of the 1991 census. Instead of the official count of 40,000 Serbs, the Democratic Party of Serbs (DPS) claims that there are between 200,000 and 300,000 Serbs in FYROM.²⁰³

Another official census was conducted during the summer of 1994, with the same dissatisfaction and claims of government interference. Allegations were made by the Serbian DPS party that the census was "unrealistic and invalid." Others contended that the "census was staged, as

²⁰²"Interior Minister on Intelligence Agency Plans," Skopje MIC, 18 Jan 95 (FBIS-EEU-95-013, 20 Jan 95).

²⁰³"Four Years Since the Formation of Political Parties in Macedonia," Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA, 22 Jan 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-100, 24 May 94).

well as that tens of thousands of Serbs were not able to obtain citizenship certificates at the time of the census."²⁰⁴ The Albanian population apparently had similar difficulties. At midpoint during the census, political leaders from the city of Diber confirmed that "no objective and real conditions have been created for the Albanians of this commune to participate in the census."²⁰⁵

Accusations of fraud were made regarding the 1994 national elections. Most of the protests against the government's conduct during the elections were made by the leading opposition party, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VRMO-DPMNE), and by the Democratic Party (DP). The DP President, Peter Gosev, called the election "state forgery," and announced that "objections" had been filed in 116 election stations across the country.²⁰⁶ Other statements by the DP characterized the elections as a "silent coup d'etat" that had been rigged to "establish an

²⁰⁴"New Reasons for Dissatisfaction," Skopje Novi Sad DNEVNIK, 25 Nov 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-233, 5 Dec 94), p. 2.

²⁰⁵"Albanian Participation in Census 'in Doubt,'" Tirana TVSH, 28 Jun 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-127, 28 Jun 94).

²⁰⁶"The Authority Uses Bolshevik Police Methods," Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA, 21 Oct 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-205, 24 Oct 94), p. 4.

illegitimate and illegal power."²⁰⁷

After the first round, the VMRO-DPMNE lodged its charges and decided to boycott the second round of elections. The VMRO-DPMNE did so because it believed the government had deprived people of their right to vote in locations around the country that had been known for affiliations with political parties in opposition to the government.²⁰⁸ In its most striking attack, the VMRO-DPMNE accused the government of interfering in the private media. According to the VMRO-DPMNE, three TV stations in the town of St. Nikole had been banned and destroyed. In addition, TV stations in Vinica and Stip had also been closed by government institutions.²⁰⁹

Besides these patterns of government resistance to political competition that might threaten the established political structure, other signs confirming Weiner's hypotheses are surfacing. Police intervention and arrests marked by "ethnic selectivity" are becoming conspicuously commonplace. Much of the police and internal security

²⁰⁷"We Shall Continue Our Struggle for a Civil Society," Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA, 24 Oct 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-204, 25 Oct 94), p. 2.

²⁰⁸"Publication of Final Results," Skopje VECER, 27 Oct 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-209, 28 Oct 94), p. 4.

²⁰⁹"VMRO-DPMNE Says Government Attacking Media," Skopje MIC, 30 Sep 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-192, 4 Oct 94).

action has centered on the Albanian ethnic community, with government allegations that Albanian paramilitary organizations are forming. The Albanian PDP party says that the increased police presence in Albanian-populated regions is unjustified, and only used by the government to pressure and intimidate the ethnic Albanians and to portray them as terrorists.²¹⁰

There is a great risk in the continued tendency of FYROM's government to resist a competitive political framework and to use police and security forces to arrest and intimidate "opponents" of the regime. Weiner believes that this tendency lends itself to the military's takeover of political power, and lists Greece in 1909 and 1967 and Pakistan in 1965 as examples of this phenomenon.²¹¹ Confirming this assessment of the risks in FYROM, Isakovic and Danopoulos state that:

...the experience of widespread political violence propagates social patterns of behavior that encourage political domination by the military....FYROM does not have tight normative constraints on the political activities of the military, and it lacks its own traditional norms of civil-military relations. The present political system is too personalistic and may not survive the eventual replacement of its founder,

²¹⁰"Political Parties Concerned Over Police Powers," Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA, 31 Mar 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-088, 31 Mar 94), p. 4.

²¹¹Weiner, "Macedonian Syndrome," pp. 676-677.

President Gligorov.²¹²

J. THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE REVISIONIST POWER

While the revisionist state becomes increasingly centralized in controlling its people and institutions, its political culture becomes fashioned by a hyper-nationalist disposition. According to Weiner, "national loyalties become paramount...There is a growing hostility to all countries and foreigners who do not support the 'just' demands of the nation, [and] hostility to internal dissent because it weakens national unity."²¹³

This characteristic is most apparent in the principles championed by the right-wing, "irredentist" political parties in FYROM. During the first multiparty elections, the VMRO-DPMNE won 38 of the 120 seats in the assembly. It acquired the name "most Macedonian," and had as its purpose "the struggle for the restoration of the pride and worthiness of the Macedonian individual, the Macedonian people, and the Macedonian state."²¹⁴ The VMRO-DPMNE had proposed amendments to the constitution which would define the republic as a "state of the Macedonian people" and which

²¹²Isakovic and Danopoulos, "Civil-Military Relations," p. 188.

²¹³Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," p. 677.

²¹⁴"Survey of Political Parties' Development," Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA, 22 Jan 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-100-S, 24 May 94).

would abandon the listing of the minorities.²¹⁵

Besides the VMRO-DPMNE, the Movement for All-Macedonian Action (MAAK) is another "nationalist" political party. On 12 November 1990, it joined with the VMRO-DPMNE, the Peoples Party, and the Agrarian Party to form the "National Front." Its views regarding the ethnic Albanian question illustrate the growing hostility toward this ethnic group in FYROM. Concerning the Albanian question, the deputy chairman of MAAK, Levko Djambazovski, said that "the Macedonian people in their own state should restore the relationship between the state and the minority. But the minority does not feel any attachment to the state; they only demand rights."²¹⁶

This is a growing sentiment of many "Macedonians" in FYROM. They regard the Albanian minority as disloyal citizens who maintain a strategy of destabilizing the state. Examples cited of this strategy include: the boycotting of referenda and the census, not voting for the constitution, refusing military service, organizing paramilitary organizations, and attempting to propagate the Albanian culture through the opening of an Albanian-language university, theater, and house of culture.²¹⁷

²¹⁵Ibid.

²¹⁶Ibid.

²¹⁷"The Macedonians in Western Macedonia Are Forgotten," Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA, 15 Jul 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-139, 15 Jul

A "nationalist" backlash has resulted from this perceived Albanian strategy to weaken the state. FYROM has expelled ethnic Albanian activists from Kosovo, has detained others, and has closed the border between Kosovo and FYROM.²¹⁸ Over a six-month period in 1994, FYROM allegedly deported 660 illegal Albanians, and detained another 1,600 Albanians, for the same purpose.²¹⁹ In constitutional matters, no amendments permitting the use of the Albanian language have passed in FYROM's Assembly.²²⁰ Police searched, sealed off and destroyed part of a building that was presumed to be part of the Albanian University in Tetovo. The police action included the arrest of the University President, and the confiscation of 114 documents of those who would be enrolled at the University.²²¹

94), p. 4.

²¹⁸"NDP Condemns Government for Expelling Radicals," Belgrade TANJUG, 27 Dec 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-249, 28 Dec 94), and "Authorities Reortedly Close Border With Serbia," Skopje MIC, 16 Dec 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-243, 19 Dec 94).

²¹⁹"Authorities Deport 600 Illegal Albanians," Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT, 29 Dec 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-251, 30 Dec 94).

²²⁰"Assembly Bans Use of Albanian in Government Body," Tirana TVSH, 1 Dec 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-232, 2 Dec 94).

²²¹"The Door of the So-Called Rector's Office Was Sealed," Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA, 15 Dec 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-243, 19 Dec 94), p. 1; and "Police Confiscate Documents," Tirana TVSH, 26 Dec 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-248, 27 Dec 94).

K. RISKY DECISIONS BY THE REVISIONIST STATE

According to Weiner's hypotheses, within the government and military, and among the people of the revisionist state, "there develops a willingness...to take chances in international affairs without any careful calculations as to the probability of a successful outcome."²²²

As examples of bungled military operations by revisionist states, Weiner cites Bulgaria's attempt to absorb the Macedonian region in 1912, Greece's efforts to expand its territory into Asia Minor in 1922, Pakistan's attack on India in an effort to gain control over Kashmir in 1965, and the Arab states' provocative actions, which led to Israel's preemptive strike and the Six-Day War in 1967. Weiner concludes that in all four instances, the political and military elites of the revisionist states overestimated their military capabilities and the support of their allies.²²³

With regard to FYROM, the potential for a self-fulfilling prophecy to be realized is increasing. FYROM's internal pressures (economy, secessionist movements), external pressures (irredentist claims), and dependency on foreign powers (Turkey, the United States) may lead some of

²²²Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," p. 677.

²²³Ibid. p. 678.

FYROM's leaders to consider acts of aggression. According to Robert Jervis, "states that seek security may believe that the best, if not the only, route to that goal is to attack and expand." Jervis adds that the "drive for security will also produce aggressive actions if [the state] feels menaced by the very presence of other strong states."²²⁴

Border skirmishes and encroachments on FYROM's northern and southern borders are becoming commonplace. After an apparent incursion into a disputed region of FYROM's territory by the Yugoslav (Serbian) Army and Air Force, FYROM's minister of defense threatened the Serbs with "international factors" and with the use of force by the "Macedonian" Army.²²⁵ Testing FYROM's patience along its southern border, there have been reports of Greek warplanes flying across the border and using the excuse of "navigational errors" for their incursions.²²⁶

Economic pressures have been used against FYROM in an uncalculated manner by Greece. The economic embargo against FYROM in February 1994 and Greece's refusal to lift the

²²⁴Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 63-64.

²²⁵"Calculated Cacophony," Belgrade VOJSKA, 30 Jun 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-129, 30 Jun 94), p. 18.

²²⁶"A Red Card Handed to the Serbs at the Vardar River Too," Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA, 29 Jun 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-130, 29 Jun 94), p. 11.

blockade and open its borders have led the EU Commission to begin legal proceedings against Greece for violating EU rules. Greece's argument for imposing the blockade is based on Article 224 of the Maastricht treaty. This article stipulates that an embargo could be enacted without the prior consultation of the other EU members in the case of a "threat of war."²²⁷ This embargo was intended by Greece to force concessions out of FYROM regarding its name, flag, and constitution, but instead its policy has had a reverse effect. FYROM has become more defiant and intransigent, though the embargo has hurt its economy, and Greece has become more isolated in the EU.²²⁸

Furthermore, "Commando" or paramilitary groups appear to be organizing, with some independent operations already executed. A militant-political wing of the VMRO-DPMNE in FYROM is now being compared with the Hitler "Jugend," Mussolini's "Black Shirts," Bulgarian "Brannik," or the Serbian "Sokoli."²²⁹ These self-professed "liberation fighters" adorn themselves in military camouflage uniforms

²²⁷"Court May Rule Against Greek Embargo," Athens I KATHIMERINI, 10 Jan 95 (FBIS-WEU-95-020, 31 Jan 95).

²²⁸Kerin Hope, "Blockade hardens hearts," Financial Times, Feb 2, 1995, p. 3.

²²⁹"Militaristic Fashion and Militant Behavior," Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA, 5 Nov 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-017, 26 Jan 95), p. 16.

and red berets (bearing the yellow lion symbol of the VMRO-DPMNE), and are heavily armed.²³⁰

There are also signs of similar paramilitary organizations in Greece. So-called "superpatriots" have been blamed by the Greek Government for carrying out an independent commando operation in Albania. It appears that the Front for the Liberation of Northern Ipiros (MAVT) conducted a raid into Albania, because of the Greek Government's inaction regarding the ethnic Greek minority in Albania.²³¹ Other "commando" groups are reported to operate in the Greek province of Thrace. This fact has incited appeals to the Greek government by Greek journalists to "investigate all the nationalistic paramilitary groups which are said to exist in border areas."²³²

These frequent military skirmishes on FYROM's northern and southern border and the formation of paramilitary or commando units are, according to Weiner, overtures for expanded military operations.

²³⁰Ibid.

²³¹"Warning Issued on Paramilitary Groups," I KATHIMERINI, Athens, 13 October 94 (FBIS-WEU-94-206, 25 October 94).

²³²Ibid.

L. TERRORISM AND COERCION AGAINST THE IRREDENTIST

GOVERNMENT BY THE IRREDENTISTS THEMSELVES

According to Weiner, "there is a high probability that [an] armed minority will turn their arms against their own government if in their judgment it fails to pursue a sufficiently aggressive expansionist policy."²³³ Weiner uses the example of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) and its role in overthrowing Bulgarian governments during the 1920's and early 1930's. In explaining this characteristic, Weiner also uses the example of Lebanon and Jordan arming Palestinian Arabs. Their policy backfired: the Palestinians turned against these supportive governments with armed aggression when they felt restrained by Lebanon and Jordan.²³⁴

The same Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (now using the abbreviation VMRO-DPMNE), cited by Weiner as an example of this characteristic during the early twentieth century, is begining today to resemble its militant days of old. It is currently acting in opposition to the government in FYROM, with open clashes between the militant wing of the VMRO-DPMNE and detachments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Members of the VMRO-DPMNE are viewed as

²³³Weiner, "Macedonian Syndrome," p. 678.

²³⁴Ibid., pp. 678-679.

"disrupters of the public order" and as "militants and destructive people." Great concern is stirred by the figures the VMRO-DPMNE boasts of in its so-called "Youth Union." Many in FYROM believe that some 15,000 youth members are being indoctrinated with nationalist propaganda by the party leadership of the VMRO-DPMNE.²³⁵

There are many examples of the VMRO-DPMNE's independent militant stance toward the government and the ethnic Albanian community in FYROM. In 1992, two members of the VMRO's Defense Committee were arrested and charged with the attempt to blow up the party headquarters of PDP and NDP in Tetovo. The VMRO-DPMNE distanced itself from the accused, and said that "it was an action at the wrong time and in the wrong place."²³⁶ In other developments, the VMRO-DPMNE's External Commission is accused of forming an "ethnic national guard" (MNG) composed of a 10,000-man army and special forces units in 1992. Since the Army of the Republic of Macedonia (ARM) was formed at the same time, the MNG units were forced to disband. This government action created a great deal of animosity, with calls by the VMRO-DPMNE for President Gligorov to resign. However, there are

²³⁵"Militaristic Fashion and Militant Behavior," Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA, 5 Nov 94 (FBIS-EEU-95-017, 26 Jan 95), p. 16.

²³⁶"Ethnic or Civil Sentences," Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA, 31 Mar 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-088, 31 Mar 94), p. 4.

reports of "thousands of armed patriots" still in operation.²³⁷

M. REVISIONIST THREAT, POLITICAL CULTURE, AND ETHNIC

HOMOGENEITY

According to Weiner,

The effects of irredentist claims on the internal political structure and on the political culture of the anti-irredentist political system depend very much on the magnitude of the threat from the revisionist state and on the degree of ethnic homogeneity in the anti-irredentist country.²³⁸

As stated above, Greece views the importance of this perceived security threat by FYROM through the prism of the historical Turkish threat from the east. Greek elites believe that Turkey is exploiting FYROM to open a second, strategic "front" with Greece. To deter and counter the perceived efforts of the Turks to gain hegemony in the Balkans, Greece is undertaking "defensive security measures and a strategically designed diplomatic initiative."²³⁹ To illustrate the perceived magnitude of this threat, it should be recalled that the combined total percentage of those polled who considered Turkey and FYROM as the main threat

²³⁷Ibid.

²³⁸Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," p. 679.

²³⁹"Comments on Needed Balkan Strategy," Athens KIRIAKATIKI ELEVTEROTIPIA, 2 Oct 94 (FBIS-WEU-94-204, 21 Oct 94).

against Greece was 93.5.²⁴⁰

Furthermore, in an interview, the Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, reiterated Greek perceptions of a Turkish threat from the east. Papandreou emphasized Greece's position that it would never concede or compromise its sovereign rights to have friendship with Turkey. According to Papandreou,

The problem from the north is associated with the problem from the east. It is a difficult period that requires of us a strategy, definite self-restraint, and a firm stance on our rights. We cannot go back even one step, because one step means two, ten, and finally, it means a decisive contraction of Hellenism. We will not allow this to happen.²⁴¹

N. OBSESSION WITH THE PAST

According to Weiner's next characteristic, the irredentist state, the status-quo state, and the shared ethnic group are all likely to have "a great concern, almost an obsession, with the past, as each actor seeks to define or justify its identity."²⁴² This obsession with the past specifically involves the parameters of historic kingdoms, historic heroes, and the culture of distinct people. Since

²⁴⁰"Foreign Policy Seen Lacking Long-Term Strategy," Athens I KATHIMERINI, 21 Aug 94 (FBIS-WEU-94-169, 31 Aug 94).

²⁴¹"Papandreou Gives News Conference," Athens ET-1, 11 Sep 94 (FBIS-WEU-94-178, 11 Sep 94).

²⁴²Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," p. 680.

these historical and cultural components create a linkage with the identity and heritage of a people, they are often glorified and deeply respected. Weiner says, "individuals will react with extraordinary vehemence to what to an outsider would appear to be trivial historical points."²⁴³

In the Balkans, this "obsession" with the past often accompanies a strong hyper-nationalist tendency, and usually one display leads to another. Here is where the conflict begins with Greece and FYROM. Greece believes that the usable past claimed by FYROM is a usurpation of its own classical past. Again, this creates fear among the Greeks that "Macedonian nationalism might spread through the efforts of irredentists who persist in claiming that Greek Macedonia is a Slav Macedonian land."²⁴⁴ In essence, Greeks point to a period in Yugoslav Macedonian history when, they believe, a political manipulation occurred for the purpose of transforming a population into ethnic "Macedonians."

Tito is accused by the Greeks of developing the framework of a "Macedonian" state, of transforming the local spoken language into the "Macedonian" language, of establishing a new Church, of reinterpreting the historical past, and finally, of providing the local people with a

²⁴³Ibid., p. 681

²⁴⁴Perry, "Macedonia: A Balkan Problem," p. 39.

mission to unify all "Macedonians" in the region.

Confirming this interpretation of Tito's intentions, C.M. Woodhouse says that "after 1945 Tito began openly talking of a Greater Macedonia which would include not only his minute, artificial province but also the major Greek province which he called Aegean Macedonia."²⁴⁵

The Greeks have responded in dramatic fashion to the events related above. Major demonstrations with more than a million participants have occurred in the streets of Athens and in the northern city of Thessaloniki. The airports in Kavala and Thessaloniki have been renamed respectively "Alexander the Great" and "Macedonian." Scores of publications describing the Greek view are being distributed by the Greek Ministry for Press and Information. Powerful Greek-American organizations in Washington have lobbied prominent Members of Congress and even the President himself on this issue. The conservative Greek government of the New Democracy lost its majority in parliament because of the Macedonian question, when right-wing members of the New Democracy party departed and began a new political party in 1993.²⁴⁶

²⁴⁵C.M. Woodhouse, "Recognizing Macedonia Defies History," Christian Science Monitor, October 28, 1992, p. 19.

²⁴⁶"Political Spring Seen Moving to Topple Government," Athens KIRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTIPIA, 22 Aug 93 (FBIS-WEU-93-

Besides objecting to FYROM's use of these symbols, the Greeks argue that FYROM has no historical, ethnic, or cultural right to use the word "Macedonia" as part of its name. Greece maintains and elaborates a complex argument in this regard. For instance, Greece holds that the word "Macedonia" is Greek. The Greeks claim that the Macedonians descended from the royal family of Argos (from central Peloponnisos) and the Argeian King Temenos and his ancestor, Heracles.²⁴⁷ And from this lineage, Alexander I, Philip II, and Alexander the Great can be traced many generations later. Proof of this, the Greeks claim, is found in several sources:

- In the enormous palace of the Macedonian kings that was uncovered in the area of Vergina (Aegea), one find mentions 'To the head of the race, Heracles.'
- Isocrates in his speech addressed to Philip II, in which he urges the Macedonian king to accept for the sake of all the Greeks the post of Commander-in-Chief in the war against the Persians, says that , '...the Thebans honor the chief of your race Heracles.'
- Also in the royal tombs of Vergina, the shield of Philip II was found on which the club of Heracles is pictured as emblem.
- The coins of Macedonia bore the figure of Heracles.
- On the origin of the royal house of Macedon and its descent from the Temenids of Argos, the opinions of most historians and men of letters of the times, such

163, 25 Aug 93), p. 4.

²⁴⁷For a detailed Greek account regarding Macedonia's origin, see N.G.L. Hammond, The Macedonian State: Origins, Institutions, and History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 18-22; and Nicolaos K. Martis, The Falsification of Macedonian History (Athens: Athanassiades Bros., 1983), pp. 20-24.

as Herodotus, Thucydides, Isocrates, generally coincide.²⁴⁸

Besides the genealogy and descent of the Macedonian Kings, the Greeks claim that there were Macedonians who won events in the Olympic games. Olympic games during this era were exclusive, and only Greeks were allowed to take part. The ancient historians, Pausanias and Herodotus, confirm this in their writings about Macedonians who won events from as early as 496 B.C. until 268 B.C.²⁴⁹

Another source the Greeks point to is a religious one.²⁵⁰ The Old Testament figure Daniel made an amazing prediction about 200 years before the rise of Alexander the Great. In this prophecy, found in the book of Daniel 8: 1-22, Daniel predicts that:

The ram which you saw with the two horns, these are the kings of Media and Persia. And the he-goat is the king of Greece; and the great horn between his eyes is the first king. As for the horn that was broken, in place of which four others arose, four kingdoms shall arise from his nation, but not with his power.²⁵¹

According to some observers, this prophecy was fulfilled in 331 B.C. when the king of Greece, Alexander the Great, defeated Darius, the king of Media and Persia, at the

²⁴⁸Nicolaos K. Martis, Falsification of Macedonian History, (Athens: Athanassiades Bros., 1983), pp. 22-23.

²⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 29-30.

²⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 69-61.

²⁵¹Daniel 8: 20-22.

Battle of Arbela. Describing the last part of the prophecy and the succession of Alexander the Great, J.F.C. Fuller wrote that "the empire he (Alexander) founded split into factions, four great monarchies arising in its stead -- Egypt under the Ptolomies, Asia under the Seleucids, Macedonia under the Antigonids, and in India the empire of Chandragupts."²⁵²

On the other hand, FYROM has also expressed its views to justify its identity. Like the Greek Prime Minister, FYROM's President Gligorov opposes a retreat or "concessions" concerning its constitutional right to bear the name "Macedonia."²⁵³ Approximately seventy five percent of those polled agree with the President, and are against changing the name "Macedonia."²⁵⁴ In a speech at the Academy Session of the Macedonian Assembly, President Gligorov emphasized that the foundations of a modern European nation, such as FYROM, are based on its distinct language and alphabet, on its long history throughout the centuries, and

²⁵²J.F.C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, Vol. I, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1954), p. 111.

²⁵³"Maximum Option," Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA, 26 Nov 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-229, 29 Nov 94), p. 13.

²⁵⁴"Poll: Majority Opposes Change of State's Name," Skopje MIC, 28 Nov 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-229, 29 Nov 94).

on the "authentic characteristics" of its nation.²⁵⁵

The danger of being locked in this uncompromising relationship is expressed by Stephen Van Evera:

Relations are worst if images diverge in self-justifying directions. This occurs if nations embrace self-justifying historical myths, or adopt distorted pictures of their own and others' current conduct and character that exaggerate the legitimacy of their own cause. Such myths and distortions can expand a nation's sense of its right and its need to oppress its minorities or conquer its diaspora.²⁵⁶

Because Greece and FYROM diverge in such an extreme manner, the likelihood of their nationalist sentiments advancing from a "purely self-liberation enterprise into a hegemonistic enterprise" increases dramatically.²⁵⁷

O. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION BY POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE MEDIA

Weiner says that those "advocating a position contrary to the majority view are likely to be considered disloyal."²⁵⁸ The effect of this policy has already been discussed above, with examples of the government in FYROM attacking the private media that offered views differing

²⁵⁵"Gligorov Looks Back on Nation's History," Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA, 2 Aug 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-153, 9 Aug 94), pp. 2-3.

²⁵⁶Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism," p. 26.

²⁵⁷Ibid.

²⁵⁸Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," p. 681.

from the government.²⁵⁹ In addition, the Constitutional Court in FYROM has been used to stifle efforts by ethnic Albanian political parties, such as the NPD.²⁶⁰

According to the Human Rights Watch/Helsinki report, Greek laws have been used to prosecute "political dissenters." Until the new Greek government repealed certain articles of the Penal Code in 1993, those citizens who candidly indicated that they were "Macedonian" or stated that a "Macedonian" ethnic minority existed in Greece were prosecuted by the Greek authorities. But, since the new law took effect, previous charges have been dropped, with the Human Rights Watch/Helsinki reporting that no one is serving a prison sentence because of political expression or dissent.²⁶¹

P. TERMINATION OF THE DISPUTE

Finally, Weiner proposes three typical solutions to the dispute. One possibility requires a military victory by the irredentist power. If a military takeover occurs by the irredentist state, then the roles may be reversed, and the

²⁵⁹For detail information, see "VMRO-DPMNE Says Government Attacking Media," Skopje MIC, 30 Sep 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-192, 4 Oct 94).

²⁶⁰"Survey of 'Political Parties' Development," Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA, 22 Jan 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-100-S, 24 May 94).

²⁶¹"The Macedonians of Greece," Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, April 1994, pp. 22-25.

defeated state may make an irredentist claim to recapture its lost territory. A second possibility involves the removal of the minority ethnic group from the disputed territory. This removal could be accomplished in many ways--through genocide, through an internally forced dispersion within the status-quo state, or through the expulsion of the minority group. A third possibility entails a credible threat by one or more dominant countries who are willing to exercise their power and prestige to impose a settlement--by military means, if necessary.²⁶²

Weiner asserts that it is difficult to predict which of the three methods or possibilities will end the dispute. But he emphasizes that the "least likely way in which the dispute can end is through voluntary agreement on the part of the disputing parties...and without the active involvement of third parties prepared to exercise their power to enforce a settlement."²⁶³

Weiner cites the post-World War II era as an example in the Balkans. He says that peace in the region stemmed from the Soviet Union's dominance throughout much of the Balkans during this time, and its capability to use force if necessary. This willingness to use force by the Soviet

²⁶²Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," pp. 681-682.

²⁶³Ibid., p. 682.

Union, or more importantly, the perception that the Soviets were willing to use force, Weiner argues, is what prevented the Balkan states from moving toward military confrontation over irredentist claims. This hypothesis is contrary to any of the "rational" solutions suggested by others--such as plebiscites, the peaceful exchanges of minorities, or a federation of Balkan states.²⁶⁴

According to Weiner,

It was only in the postwar era, when the Soviet Union emerged as the dominant power in the Balkans, willing to intervene to prevent one or another Balkan state from using force to assert its border claims--and militarily capable of such intervention--that peace was established in the region.²⁶⁵

This hypothesis appears to have some basis in fact since Yugoslavia, although supposedly nonaligned during the Cold-War, did not fall apart and erupt into conflict when its long time leader and dictator, Josef Broz Tito, died in 1980.

It was not until the Berlin Wall had crumbled in 1989 and the former Soviet Union began splitting apart in 1991 that Yugoslavia and other Balkan countries began once more to distinguish themselves through their ethnic antagonisms and historic disputes. The external context also affected the two noncommunist Balkan countries--Greece and Turkey.

²⁶⁴Ibid.

²⁶⁵Ibid.

Their security from attack by the Soviet Union was enhanced by their entry into NATO in 1952. Even their historic antagonisms were dampened by the East-West stalemate that characterized the Cold War. Thus, both superpowers were instrumental in imposing a quasi-peace in the region, by which war was prevented for approximately forty-two years. (The main exception qualifying this observation was the Greek-Turkish War over Cyprus in 1974.)

V. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

Assessing the Macedonian question and the difficulties regarding a settlement of this dispute, Charles Homer Haskins and Robert Howard Lord concluded that:

The Macedonian question has been before the world a sufficiently long time to have thoroughly wearied most people of it, perhaps, but not long enough to produce a clear understanding or any real unanimity of opinion about it. It presents, on the one hand, such a medley of jarring races, long-standing animosities, and ever-recurring atrocities, and, on the other hand, such a jumble of ethnographic riddles, philological controversies, psychological uncertainties, unreliable statistics, assertions and counter-assertions flatly contradictory on every point, that one almost despairs of an idea as to how it ought to be settled, or of the hope of ever seeing it settled at all.²⁶⁶

This gloomy assessment accurately portrays the current situation in the Macedonian region. Yet it illustrates the continuity regarding the complexities of this dispute, because it was written after the Paris Peace Conference in 1920.

The question still remains as it did in 1920: what are the prospects for a peaceful solution to this long-lasting dispute in the Macedonian region? Weiner's analysis offers a good starting point in answering these questions. The only viable possibility for a peaceful settlement between Greece and FYROM is one in which a third party or coalition

²⁶⁶Charles Homer Haskins and Robert Howard Lord, Some Problems of the Peace Conference (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920), pp. 267-268.

would use its power to promote and enforce a settlement.

It is unrealistic to believe that FYROM alone could militarily defeat Greece and occupy Greece's northern province of Macedonia. Even though Greece may perceive FYROM's intent as being hostile, FYROM lacks the warfighting potential as measured by troop strength and armaments (such as tanks, artillery, and planes) to conduct a successful conventional military operation against Greece.

Unconventional warfare is a more dangerous threat to Greek security at this point. Nikoloas Zahariadis makes the assessment that the early stages of a low-intensity conflict between Greece and FYROM have already materialized, and cites examples of psychological warfare and prospects for an insurgency.²⁶⁷

Another possible strategy for FYROM's expansion, Zahariadis writes, "is to divert international attention to disputes among its [FYROM's] more powerful neighbors in the hope of finding surrogate fighting powers."²⁶⁸ This scenario would involve great risks to the combatants, because they might be politically, economically, or even militarily isolated by the rest of Europe, NATO or the United Nations.

²⁶⁷Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Is the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia a Security Threat to Greece?" Mediterranean Quarterly, Winter 1994, pp. 93-95.

²⁶⁸Ibid., p. 91.

And it is equally unrealistic, at this juncture, to believe that Greece would recognize a separate ethnic "Macedonian" minority living within its borders. This recognition would have to occur before any type of population transfer could take place.

A. THE "CRITICAL MARGIN"

Therefore, with Weiner's third solution in mind, the only "Great Power" that has the qualifications and at the same time would not be perceived as a historical hegemon in the region is the United States. Other "Great Powers" that may be returning to reclaim their influence are discredited in Balkan eyes because of the political "baggage" they bring from their past exploits in the region. International and regional organizations such as the U.N. and NATO are currently too fractured regarding Balkan issues, and have proven ineffective in solving the conflict raging in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

According to Walt W. Rostow, the U.S. plays the role of the "critical margin" in international affairs. Rostow says that "at the margin, the quiet, purposeful presence of the United States is required to sustain the balance of power" throughout the world. In Rostow's view, the United States "cannot impose its will on others as a hegemonic power, but big things can't get done in the world without our active

participation."²⁶⁹ And according to Josef Joffe,

It is Washington that orchestrates the Middle East peace process. America, not Germany or Japan, leads the drive against the spread of the Bomb, coaxes North Korea and confronts Iraq....There are more power centers now than during the cold war. But the U.S. still sits on top of the heap.²⁷⁰

As the "critical margin," the United States has the opportunity to play a major active role in the solution to this dispute. This dispute has the potential to involve several states in an expanded, full-scale Balkan war, which would differ from the two Balkan Wars of the early twentieth century. Most notably, the chances for containing the conflict are now diminished because of the modernization of the armed forces of Balkan states such as Serbia, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Greece--above all, the lethality, range, and quantity of their weaponry. A military conflict over the Macedonian question would in all likelihood incite a clash between Greece and Turkey, and would probably be conducted with the most violent means available.

The challenge for United States in this regional dispute will be to balance its national security strategy of engagement and enlargement with its post-Cold War domestic

²⁶⁹Walt W. Rostow, "Regionalism in a Global System," in From Globalism to Regionalism, ed. Patrick M. Cronin (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1993), p. 135.

²⁷⁰Josef Joffe, "The U.S. Is Still No. 1," New York Times, April 25, 1995, p. A15.

political constraints. Internally, U.S. foreign policy is constrained by the very nature of a democracy, which usually undertakes military action only on a last resort basis. Operation Desert Storm is a good example of this phenomenon. There were passionate calls by some in the United States and overseas for a solution through diplomatic and economic pressure, even after a clear violation by Iraq of Kuwait's internationally recognized borders.

Furthermore, with the continued pressures to balance the budget, the United States government will find it difficult to build the public support it needs to intervene in regions not vital to U.S. interests. This economic constraint will also have an effect on the availability of U.S. forces and the time it will take to deploy them to the area of conflict, since U.S. forces that were "forward deployed" during the Cold-War era are decreasing in size and capability.²⁷¹

Washington's post-Cold War foreign policy struggle has been illustrated in the northern Balkans. Without clearly established interests in the northern Balkans, the United States has been reluctant to commit itself to establish

²⁷¹For a detailed explanation of U.S. constraints in the post-Cold War era, see John J. Arquilla's forthcoming article, "Bound to Fail? Regional Deterrence After the Cold War," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 14, no. 2, 1995.

peace in Bosnia. According to Misha Glenny,

The Bosnian government in Sarajevo feels betrayed because Washington's rhetoric in favor of a unified Bosnia was never backed by force. One should either wage war on behalf of the Bosnian government or clearly state that one has no intention of doing so. Washington's great mistake was that it did neither: it held out the prospect of intervention if the Bosnian government's position continued to deteriorate, then did nothing when it came to the crunch.²⁷²

On the other hand, it appears that the United States has taken a different approach in the southern Balkans. The United States has made commitments that seem to represent distinctly defined security interests in this strategically important region. United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher publicly declared U.S. resolve to prevent the Bosnian conflict from spilling into FYROM and opening a "southern front." Furthermore, the U.S. State Department has dispatched three envoys to the region in an effort to improve relations between Greece and Albania, Greece and FYROM, and Greece and Turkey. The U.S. Defense Department has deployed troops in FYROM along its border with Serbia, and has reportedly deployed intelligence assets in northern Albania to monitor events in Bosnia and Serbia.²⁷³

²⁷²Misha Glenny, "Heading Off War in the Southern Balkans," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3, May/June 1995, p. 100.

²⁷³Ibid., p. 107.

According to Misha Glenny, the United States is interested in the southern Balkans because of its concern with the threat to its lines of communication with the Middle East via the Aegean Sea and Turkey. In other words, this increased interest on the part of the United States is due to the strategic importance it places on the southern Balkans and the Aegean Sea. The geostrategic importance of the Macedonian region includes the north-south routes leading into the Aegean, and the east-west route linking the port of Durres on the Adriatic to Istanbul in Turkey. In addition, the United States is concerned about the increased potential for a war involving Greece, Turkey, Serbia, Bulgaria, FYROM, and Albania: the rise in ethnic conflict within FYROM; and Turkey's changing domestic politics, including the success of the Islamic Welfare Party in its two most populous cities (Istanbul and Ankara).²⁷⁴

A negligence on the part of the United States to "balance its commitments and capabilities" regarding regional security in the southern Balkans may induce a state of "insolvency, a condition that encourages aggressors." This condition characterized U.S. foreign policy from Spanish-American War until entry into World War II.²⁷⁵ To

²⁷⁴Ibid., pp. 103-106.

²⁷⁵Ibid.

counter its isolationist tendencies, its temptation to defer to a multilateral collective security organization such as the United Nations, and its tendency to undertake only reactive measures, the United States ought to implement its national security strategy of engagement and enlargement with a southern Balkan foreign policy similar to the "Truman Doctrine" and the "Marshall Plan."

On March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman announced that it would be "the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."²⁷⁶ This declaration--which became known as the "Truman Doctrine"--prepared the way for the United States to take on the traditional British role of blocking the Russian advance toward the warm water ports of the Mediterranean. As a result, President Truman requested that security assistance amounting to \$400 million be granted to Greece and Turkey.

The "Marshall Plan" for economic aid to Europe was announced as a companion to the "Truman Doctrine" in June 1947. In a commencement address at Harvard on June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall announced the European

²⁷⁶Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, 1947 vol. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 178, cited in Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 453.

Recovery Program, which provided \$12 billion in reconstruction assistance to European states. This was only a small fraction of the total investment, since European recipients contributed nearly eight times that amount.

However, it was not just the financial amount that made an impact on European stability, but also the institutional linkage it brought to the countries that participated. Institutions linking countries and promoting cooperation like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Payments Union (EPU) were established. According to Jack Snyder, the Marshall Plan "had a multiplier effect on economic efficiency, while politically it strengthened internationally-oriented sectors and coalitions against their insular, protectionist competitors."²⁷⁷

A southern Balkan foreign policy based on security measures characterized by the "Truman Doctrine" and by economic recovery and interdependence that was characterized by the "Marshall Plan" in post-World War II Europe, might provide preventive measures necessary for a peaceful solution instead of reactive measures that merely "put out

²⁷⁷Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," in The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace, eds. Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), p. 130.

fires." The danger of continuing with a reactive foreign policy in the southern Balkans is that the potential for a spark to quickly get out of control is currently present in FYROM. The conflict in Bosnia illustrates not only how quickly war can erupt in a multiethnic state, but how difficult it is to control the conflict once it begins.

These foreign policy measures based on engagement and enlargement would subdue obstacles that typically hinder deterrence and the peaceful settlement of disputes. First, an engagement and enlargement strategy in the Balkans could provide an example of U.S.-led "collective enforcement" action, as in the Gulf War. The fractured response in the prolonged war in Bosnia demonstrates that the Security Council of the United Nations is "an entity to be led, not to lead," and that the concept of multilateralism "depends upon, and starts with, unilateralism."²⁷⁸ In fact, Inis L. Claude defines multilateralism simply as "unilateralism plus."²⁷⁹

Secondly, a U.S.-led engagement and enlargement strategy in the southern Balkans could prevent an incremental response or a tendency toward the "gradualism"

²⁷⁸Inis L. Claude, "Collective Security After the Cold War," Third Annual Strategy Conference, Strategic Studies Institute, February 1992, pp. 17-18.

²⁷⁹Ibid., p. 18.

that typically plagues democracies. It would also demonstrate U.S. commitment and resolve, which arguably would be necessary to "counter the zealotry endemic to burgeoning nationalist, revivalist and syndicalist mass movements."²⁸⁰ Examples of U.S. resolve and its deterrent effect in the post-Cold War era include America's willingness to deploy forces early in the Gulf War during Operation Desert Shield and the deployment of U.S. peacekeepers in FYROM along the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Both actions arguably prevented aggression by a potentially hostile state.

The United States should not have to pursue this policy of engagement and enlargement in the Balkans unilaterally. It should merely provide the "critical margin" necessary for its success. That means the United States could take the lead through organizations such as NATO and encourage greater involvement by the EU, which certainly has legitimate interests in the Balkan region, and which could help the United States bear the costs and risks. John J. Arquilla suggests that some form of "security insurance" could be paid to the United States to offset its expenses while deterring regional aggression during peacetime. This

²⁸⁰See John J. Arquilla's forthcoming article, "Bound to Fail?" p. 21.

"regional security insurance," Arquilla argues, would encourage the "solvency of U.S. foreign policy" by balancing its costs and benefits.²⁸¹

B. THE ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY: A BALKAN "TRUMAN DOCTRINE"

The "Truman Doctrine" was a radical change in U.S. foreign policy that reversed a trend of "isolationism" and initiated one that was "interventionalist" or "globalist" in nature. This commitment took the form of a containment strategy in the Cold War struggle of ideology, which applied selective "counterforce to restrain Soviet expansionist moves."²⁸² A preeminent objective of this selective engagement strategy was to guarantee the security of states that had grasped a democratic ideal but that were now threatened with being engulfed into the Soviet orbit. This commitment, given by President Truman in a speech to the House and Senate on March 12, 1947, was presented to "political conservatives--who, after the congressional elections of 1946, comprised a majority of the legislature--were interested above all in reducing taxes and the level of governmental spending."²⁸³

²⁸¹Ibid., p. 23.

²⁸²Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), p. 113.

²⁸³Ibid., p. 124.

The same political courage and foresight needed in 1947 to implement this selective counterforce strategy is necessary as an identical situation, described above, confronts and constrains the U.S. Congress today. That is, political conservatives in the Congress--for instance, Republicans in the House of Representatives who signed a "Contract with America"--have argued for reducing taxes and government spending. The international situation clearly differs, in that the United States no longer faces a superpower that is ideologically hostile and that is leading an expansionist movement that must be "contained."

A Trumanesque foreign policy strategy regarding the Macedonian question would contain the anarchic effects of hyper-nationalism and irredentism. And like the "Truman Doctrine" of old, a pillar of this new engagement strategy in the southern Balkans would be to guarantee the security of states that have embraced the democratic ideal and that are threatened by the effects of hyper-nationalism and irredentism in a Hobbesian world.

The justification for such a policy in the southern Balkans could be derived from the U.S. (and Western) interest in keeping the lines of communication open to the Middle East. This is especially important since the United States and its Western allies view the security of the

Middle East/Persian Gulf region (and the uninterrupted flow of oil) as a vital interest. Also, some might argue, this strategic region could serve as a buffer area to protect Europe from Islamic fundamentalism.

The first step in this engagement policy would be for the United States and its Western partners to provide unambiguous, specific security guarantees to both Greece and FYROM. These defensive security guarantees would only be triggered if an individual state was attacked, and not if that state committed aggression in any manner. Furthermore, these security guarantees should preferably come in the form of treaties ratified by the U.S. Senate and the legislatures of the other NATO governments. If the legislative branch in the United States is not persuaded to support this measure, then an executive agreement by the President would serve as a strong enough initiative and warning to deter possible aggressors.²⁸⁴

FYROM's elites may consider Greece a threat to FYROM's national security; but in actuality, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Albania are more plausible threats than is Greece. One specific measure that would strengthen FYROM's security would be to continue the U.N. deployment of troops along its

²⁸⁴For a broader summary of political initiatives, see John J. Arquilla's forthcoming article, "Bound to Fail," pp. 21-22.

border with Serbia. This would give legitimacy to FYROM's government. Moreover, with U.S. soldiers participating prominently in the mission, it would also represent U.S. resolve in guaranteeing FYROM's national integrity.

Another form of deterrence could include a contingency plan that would expand the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers to other points along FYROM's borders. The single most important factor in this measure and the others would be to strengthen FYROM because of the historic "vacuum" propensity and the temptation that this brings its neighbors when the strategically situated Macedonian region (or any of its parts) is vulnerable. Arms transfers and military training from the West could also strengthen FYROM and contribute to an equilibrium in the region, but such measures would have to be implemented in a manner that would not threaten the security of FYROM's neighbors or add to the ambiguous inputs that might well stimulate a "spiraling" relationship of mutual mistrust. A principle that should be considered when assessing military posturing in the region is that a state with an irredentist claim should not be militarily superior, especially in offensive capability, in relation to its neighbors.²⁸⁵ This may be a difficult principle to enforce, but all means available should be used to thwart the

²⁸⁵Snyder, "Averting Anarchy," p. 132.

temptations that may arise when the combination of offensive capabilities and irredentist claims is present.

In addition to measures stemming from security guarantees and assistance, steps should be taken to defuse "spiraling" tensions between Greece and FYROM. The lack of a "sovereign" in regional and international politics and the "consequences of living in a Hobbesian state of nature," in Robert Jervis's view, exacerbate a "spiraling" relationship and enable wars to occur.²⁸⁶ If the United States was committed to this role as "sovereign," however, the United States might be able to persuade Greece and FYROM that they are locked in a "spiraling" relationship that is counter to their interests.

One method to achieve this initial reconciliation would be to encourage initiatives to be taken by both sides simultaneously that would increase the other's security. According to Jervis, these simultaneous initiatives would warm relations between the two states locked in a "spiraling" relationship. The reason, he explains, is that such initiatives might reduce the offensive capabilities states possess, and might also furnish proof of a state's nonviolent intentions.²⁸⁷

²⁸⁶Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 62-63.

²⁸⁷Ibid., p. 82.

One initiative along these lines could come in the form of a conventional forces agreement between Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey. The negotiations for such an agreement could be sponsored and coordinated by the United States and other security partners. This agreement might defuse tensions by reducing offensive capabilities and forces that are built up along the borders in Thrace. A gradual reduction in forces in this sensitive area could eventually lead to the establishment of a buffer zone that would emphasize effective defensive measures. According to Jervis, "when the defense has the advantage over the offense, a large increase in one state's security only slightly decreases the security of the others, and status-quo powers can all enjoy a high level of security and largely escape from the state of nature."²⁸⁸

A related measure would be for the United States and its Western allies to phase out the security assistance they provide in the form of weapons transfers, loans, grants, and equipment sales to Greece and Turkey. This policy of security assistance, which has continued since the end of the Cold War, might have played a significant role in

²⁸⁸Robert Jervis, "Offense, Defense, and the Security Dilemma," in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, eds. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1992)p. 146.

creating an arms race between Greece and Turkey and, according to the "spiral model," is "most apt to heighten tensions and create illusory incompatibility."²⁸⁹

These policy measures would have an important effect on Greece's relationship with FYROM, since a Greek-Turkish detente and the lessening of insecurities would naturally spill over into relations with FYROM. A detente between Greece and Turkey and a decrease in their defense budgets (perhaps coupled with modifications in Western security assistance) would help both countries to concentrate on economic recovery and growth. Except for France, Greece and Turkey are the only two countries in NATO that have increased their defense budgets since the end of the Cold War, while their national debt continues to increase and their economies have stagnated. For instance, Greece currently has a national public debt of more than 110 per cent of its gross domestic product.²⁹⁰

Robert Jervis also argues that "a willingness to fight for issues of low intrinsic value [and the] avoidance of any appearances of weakness" are types of behavior that heighten "spiraling" tensions.²⁹¹ From this perspective, Greece and

²⁸⁹Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions, p. 84.

²⁹⁰Kerin Hope, "Walking the Economic Tightrope," Financial Times, November 14, 1994, p. 2

²⁹¹Ibid.

FYROM should be persuaded by the United States and its Western allies to not allow the complexities of competitive nationalism to prevent them from exploiting the lucrative opportunities they now possess in the Balkan region. To become shortsighted at this juncture would jeopardize an occasion for both to have a regional impact in terms of economic expansion and political, military, and religious cooperation.

Greece and FYROM must also be persuaded to not carry out their foreign policies with a diplomatic effort darkened by a "crusading spirit." For, as Hans J. Morgenthau wrote, "a diplomacy that thinks in legalistic and propagandistic terms is particularly tempted to insist upon the letter of the law, as it interprets the law, and to lose sight of the consequences such insistence may have for its own nation and for humanity."²⁹²

Instead, Greece and FYROM must be willing to compromise on issues that are not vital to their national interests. The word "Macedonia," the Sun of Vergina, maps of a greater Macedonian state including part of northern Greece, currency displaying the Greek city of Thessaloniki, and a constitution implying aspirations to a greater Macedonia are

²⁹²Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), p. 555.

all--understandably--seen as provocations by Greece.

However, they are no more than provocations, and they do not tangibly threaten the integrity of Greece's national territory and institutions. FYROM should recognize how the name and symbols that it chooses for its state are perceived by the Greeks, and should initiate concrete, unambiguous measures to define alternatives or compromises. On the other hand, the focus of Greek diplomacy should be on the nation's present, confirmed, national security, and not on a speculative scenario for the future. A prudent government should be keenly aware of any future danger on the horizon, but should first secure support from its principal allies. A government can only accomplish this task if it reacts to the behavior of provocateurs with restraint, and avoids a "crusading spirit."

Here is where compromise plays a crucial role. Edmund Burke, commenting on the significance of compromise in political affairs, says that "all government, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue and every prudent act, is founded on compromise and barter. We balance inconveniences; we give and take; we remit some rights, that we may enjoy others; and we choose rather to be happy citizens than subtle disputants."²⁹³ A nation and its

people, therefore, who consider their foreign affairs in legalistic terms, who insist on their own rights according to their own view, and who are unwilling to compromise for the sake of peaceful relations, place themselves in danger and choose to be "subtle disputants" rather than "happy citizens."

An initial step toward reconciliation could take the form of Greece lifting its economic blockade and recognizing FYROM, while some compromise regarding FYROM's name and symbols is defined. For example, a name change could denote a geographic definition, such as adding "Vardar" or "Upper" to the name "Macedonia," or it could involve adding "New" to the name. Another compromise could be for FYROM to be officially and fully recognized by the U.N. and other states by one name, and recognized by Greece by another.

C. THE ENLARGEMENT STRATEGY: A BALKAN "MARSHALL PLAN"

In addition to a Hobbesian prescription that would impose political order in the region, a second step is essential to facilitate regional peace. That is, the United States and its Western allies could deflect the domestic repercussions in Greece and FYROM caused by compromise with

²⁹³Edmund Burke, "Speech on the Conciliation with America," (1775), The Works of Edmund Burke (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1865), Vol II, p. 169, as quoted by Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), p. 554.

a "carrot and stick" policy. The United States and its Western allies might attempt to reward positive steps taken by the political elites of Greece and FYROM toward peaceful relations by arguing that Athens and Skopje deserve support from international and regional institutions. An enlargement strategy based on a new type of "Marshall Plan" could be used to thwart the appeals of hyper-nationalism and irredentism in this region.

Thus, a strategy of enlargement through international and regional institutions could be used to coordinate and direct political energies in benign directions. Regional and international institutions would also be used to "fill the gap between booming political participation and a weak domestic order threatened by the competing demands of illiberal organized interests."²⁹⁴ In short, a means of institutional accountability would be established that would provide incentives for cooperation and penalties for regressive behavior.

This Balkan economic recovery program would form the second part in the overall strategy, just as the "Marshall Plan" provided an essential counterpart to the "Truman Doctrine." And instead of an economic aid program designed to promote democracy and prosperity and to thwart the Soviet

²⁹⁴Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy," p. 131.

Union, this enlargement strategy would aim at thwarting the rise of hyper-nationalism and irredentism, and would encourage Balkan market reforms, economic interdependence and recovery, and the linking of this reconstruction program with the European Union and the United States.

According to Jack Snyder, "the Marshall Plan worked by creating international institutions to channel domestic interests in a direction favorable to international cooperation and stability."²⁹⁵ Practically speaking, this enlargement strategy would follow Stephen Van Evera's policy prescription (similar to the Charter of Paris in 1990 and the "stability pact" approved by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in March 1995), which stipulates that Western economic relations with new Eastern states should be conditioned on their compliance with six principles: (1) rejecting the use of force in settling disputes; (2) guaranteeing the rights of national minorities; (3) refraining from chauvinist propaganda; (4) adopting a democratic form of government; (5) introducing free markets and economic reforms; and (6) recognizing current national borders.²⁹⁶

²⁹⁵Ibid., p. 130.

²⁹⁶Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism," pp. 36-37.

An enlargement strategy based on economic reconstruction and interdependence could counter the threat of hyper-nationalism and war, since one of Van Evera's hypotheses on nationalism and war says that "if economic conditions deteriorate, publics become more receptive to scapegoat myths, hence such myths are more widely believed, hence war is more likely."²⁹⁷ Non-observance or deviation from the approved principles of conduct would bar Balkan states from Western markets and would bring additional economic sanctions. Thus, threatening to withdraw the "carrot" of the economic assistance and security guarantees offered by the United States and major West European governments would form the basis for the "stick" policy. In other words, this policy would apply international and regional economic penalties and military responses if cross-border military aggression or other acts of war occurred. It appears that the United States has already implicitly accepted such an obligation in the southern Balkans with a deployment of troops forming a "line in the sand" in FYROM.

A regional organization or agency could be established to monitor compliance with the approved principles of conduct. This agency could then dispense economic assistance on the basis of a formula for states that comply

²⁹⁷Ibid., p. 9.

with the above criteria. In addition to the compliance with the approved principles of conduct, voluntary decreases in military expenditures could also be rewarded with some form of economic assistance. Within this agency, an inter-state payments mechanism could be established along the lines of the European Payments Union (EPU). As Stanley Fischer suggests, a payments mechanism of this sort could facilitate transactions among the central banks of each state in the union; serve as a mechanism to extend credit and prevent balance of payment problems; and provide a central organization that could stimulate inter-state cooperation.²⁹⁸

Consequently, this strategy of enlargement by the United States and its Western allies would restrain and channel Balkan hyper-nationalism and irredentism in benign directions. This enlargement strategy based on economic development and the promotion of democracy in the Balkans would be consistent with America's national security strategy as well. For the U.S. National Security Strategy says that:

All of America's strategic interests...are served by enlarging the community of democratic and free market nations. Thus, working with new democratic states to help preserve them as democracies committed to free markets and respect for human rights, is a key part of

²⁹⁸Stanley Fischer, "Stabilization and Economic Reform in Russia," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992, p. 105

our national security strategy.²⁹⁹

The promotion of democracy is a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy in most regions. The argument for the promotion of democracy is not that democracies are less aggressive or not predisposed to hostility toward nondemocracies, but that democracies are not aggressive and hostile toward other democracies.³⁰⁰ Immanuel Kant offers insight into this theory:

If the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared, nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game...But, on the other hand, in a constitution which is not republican and under which the subjects are not citizens, a declaration of war is the easiest thing in the world to decide upon, because war does not require of the ruler, who is the proprietor and not a member of the state, the least sacrifice of the pleasure of his table, the chase, his country houses, his court functions, and the like.³⁰¹

Democratic principles do not change human nature, but act as a "leash of accountability" for political elites. Thus, assisting Balkan states in democratic reforms and

²⁹⁹A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, The White House, February 1995, p. 22.

³⁰⁰Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," eds. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, International Politics (New York: HarperCollings Publishers, 1992), p. 65.

³⁰¹Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace," in The Enlightenment, ed. Peter Gay (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1974), pp. 790-792, cited in Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," eds. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, International Politics (New York: HarperCollings Publishers, 1992), p. 66.

institutions that do not centralize power may provide the accountability necessary for restraining hostility. There is nonetheless always the risk that a rise in hyper-nationalist sentiment could undermine democratic principles and institutions; and these events could lead to war.

But the risk of war is even greater when the effects of hyper-nationalism and irredentism are unrestrained in a centralized, undemocratic state. On the other hand, long-term democratic stability would be endangered if emerging democracies adopted a form of majority tyranny and oppressed minorities. To counter this tendency, Van Evera argues, multi-ethnic states such as FYROM should adopt consociational power-sharing rules along the Swiss model of democracy that would implement non-majoritarian principles.³⁰²

D. CONCLUSION

Weiner's insightful model, written in 1971, predicted what might well happen when external forces, such as those engaged in the East-West power struggle during the Cold War, no longer dominated politics in the Balkans while local irredentist claims remained salient. Only the determined leadership of a great power, such as the United States,

³⁰²Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," p. 35.

might be able to counter these forces by imposing a new set of principles of conduct.

Such leadership, according to Inis L. Claude, must possess the "resolution and audacity to move out front, to pull the majority along rather than to wait for it, to carry the lion's share of the burden while tolerating free riders, and to live with the inevitable criticism."³⁰³ The United States has proven itself capable of such leadership in the past. If it deems this situation in the southern Balkans important to its security interests, and its initial approach suggests that it does, then it is imperative that it find the political will to provide leadership regarding this explosive issue. Otherwise, the current reactive U.S. foreign policy approach in the southern Balkans might always be a step or two behind. That would be a dangerous way to conduct policy in this strategically important and volatile region.

³⁰³Inis L. Claude, "Collective Security After the Cold War," Third Annual Strategy Conference, Strategic Studies Institute, February 1992, p. 18.

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